

CULTURAL IDENTITY AND REGIONAL SECURITY  
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by  
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

CULTURAL IDENTITY AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS, by MAJ Marko Marjanovic, Serbian Armed Forces, 97 pages.

The research problem of this thesis is to find the critical relation or connection between the cultural identity and regional security in the Western Balkans. “Is cultural identity critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans?” is the central research question of this thesis. The thesis uses a qualitative descriptive research approach, and the main method is case study of the Western Balkans. This thesis utilizes the analytical frameworks of securitization, regional security complex and security sectors to interpret its findings.

Findings of this research showed that cultural identity did not influence crucible historical events in the region, and that rather it was the opposite—the crucible historical events changed the cultural map of the Western Balkans. Findings also point out that the current process of security reforms did not advance.

In conclusion this thesis disregards the common assumption of ancient hatreds and clashes of civilizations and puts the blame for recent conflicts in the Western Balkans on political elites that manipulated the population and the international community that favored right of self-determination instead of territorial integrity. This thesis offers recommendations for action that will foster regional security based upon the new regional identity.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	ix
TABLES .....	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
Overview.....	1
Background .....	1
Motivation.....	3
Qualifications .....	5
Topic and the Research Problem .....	5
Topic .....	5
Research Problem Statement .....	5
Importance and Significance.....	6
Purpose.....	7
General Definitions .....	7
Cultural Identity .....	7
Regional Security.....	8
Western Balkans .....	9
Research Questions and Hypothesis .....	9
Central Question .....	9
Subquestions .....	10
Hypothesis.....	10
Assumptions and Limitations .....	10
Assumptions.....	10
Limitations .....	11
Scope and Delimitations .....	12
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	14
General Overview .....	14
Purpose and Need for the Literature Review .....	14
Organization of Sources.....	15
Method and Key Words .....	16

Historically Focused Sources.....	17
Before Yugoslavia .....	17
Period of Yugoslavia.....	19
Dissolution and Wars for the Yugoslav Succession .....	21
Theoretically Focused Sources .....	22
Analytically Focused Sources.....	25
Chapter Summary .....	27
 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	 33
Selection of Tools .....	33
Qualitative Nature of Research .....	33
Definition and Characteristics of Qualitative Research.....	34
Case Study as Qualitative Approach.....	35
Strengths and Weaknesses of Chosen Methodology .....	36
Process of Designing .....	36
Preliminary Considerations.....	36
Phases and Steps in the Process .....	37
Challenges.....	40
English as a Second Language.....	40
Ethical Challenges .....	40
 CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS .....	 42
Historical Events That Shaped the Cultural Map of the Western Balkans .....	43
Division between Eastern and Western Christian Church.....	43
The Rise and Fall of Medieval Kingdoms in the Western Balkans .....	44
Ottoman Conquest and Pacification of the Balkans. ....	48
Establishment of the Croatian Military Border.....	49
Liberation of Serbia and Montenegro .....	49
Balkan Wars and Macedonian Question.....	50
Yugoslav Idea .....	51
First Yugoslav Experiment .....	52
Second World War.....	53
Second Yugoslav Experiment.....	54
Wars for Yugoslav Succession .....	56
Societal Security Sector in the Western Balkans Security Sub-Complex	
Unit Level Analytical Approach.....	59
Albania.....	60
Bosnia and Herzegovina .....	60
Croatia.....	61
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.....	61
Montenegro .....	61
Serbia and Kosovo .....	62
Cultural Identity and Future Cooperation in the Western Balkans Regional	
Analytical Approach .....	62

Why is Regional Identity Important for Security Cooperation? .....	63
What Problems Stand in the Way of New Regional Identity in the Western Balkans? .....	64
Chapter Summary .....	65
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	74
Conclusions .....	74
Research Questions Answered .....	74
Significance of Conclusions for Future Research .....	77
Recommendations .....	77
Recommendations for Action .....	77
Recommendations for Future Research .....	78
GLOSSARY .....	80
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	82



## ACRONYMS

BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina)
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DR	Defense Review
EC	European Community
EU	European union
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro 2003-2006)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDH	Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945)
RSC	Regional Security Complex
RSSC	Regional Security Sub-Complex
SGA	Small Group Advisor
SOD	Strategy of Defense
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
TRSC	Theory of Regional Security Complex

## TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Proportion of the ethnic Muslims, Serbs, Croats, “Yugoslavs,” and Other Nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1948-1991 (percentage).....	54
Table 2. Timeline of Wars for Yugoslav Succession 1991-1999 .....	57

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter is aiming to set the stage for the reader with introducing and focusing the study. Initially, in the Overview section, thesis attempts to attract reader's attention and reveal background, motivation, and qualifications for the research. Additionally, it will outline the following chapters. After that, in the second part, chapter introduces the topic and the research problem. Then it will briefly glance on the evidence from the literature that justify the research problem. After identification of deficiencies in the evidence, chapter suggests possible importance and significance of the study. In the third part, chapter proposes Purpose Statement and gives key definitions of the central phenomenon. Those definitions will represent the starting point for this research. Further, reader will find the Research Questions and Hypothesis. Finally, the Limitations section puts the borders between what this research is and what is not. Thesis outline for this chapter originates from a Qualitative Constructivist/Interpretivist Format by Creswell,<sup>1</sup> and a Theoretical /Interpretative Lens Format by Marshall and Rossman.<sup>2</sup> John W. Creswell explained both approaches in his book *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*.<sup>3</sup>

### Overview

#### Background

Culture and identity do matter. Ethno-national conflicts, that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia, between 1990 and 1995, and again in 1999, attracted much of world's attention. Large numbers of casualties, refugees and displaced persons, atrocities and

crime that accompanied the bloody sequence of events were shocking for the majority of the international audience. As much it was unbelievable for the world what was going on, it was just as unbelievable for the people that were the part of it. Just right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Western Balkan nations started to build their own walls. Some of the bricks in those walls were cultural. This thesis is an attempt to reveal the impact of cultural identity on the conflicts in the past, to analyze present cultural identities of the Western Balkans, and to develop recommendations for reconciliation through cultural identity as one line of effort.

Imagine a chessboard. Imagine white and black fields, and white and black figures moving according to the rules. The colors are clear and distinct. The board is square and divided equally. Although, not the simplest one of all, the Chess game rules are widely known and easy to follow. Since its invention, chess was very popular strategy game mirroring the state versus state war conflict. There have been some attempts to make this game more complicated like Glinsky's hexagonal chess and fourhanded chess, each comprising different boards and more complex rules. Now, can you imagine fields, kings, queens, knights, bishops and pawns changing their colors? Can you imagine rules changing during the game? That kind of game is certainly hard to play, almost as the Western Balkans Security situation is today. The chess game is the author's metaphor for the "Western Balkans Chess Game" in the field of security. Unfortunately, it is even more complex than the chess variants mentioned. That is why the security in the Western Balkans is a challenging research topic. Well-known Zbigniew Brzezinski used a similar metaphor already in his famous *The Grand Chessboard*,<sup>4</sup> but he refers more to Eurasia

and the “board” as the territory and this thesis will focus on “colors” instead, trying to depict the changes and diversity in cultural identities of the Western Balkans.

Beside the fog of civil war, two occurrences coincided and further concealed the background of this problem. These were: (1) the end of Cold War and reconsideration of the NATO’s role in the post-Cold War world, and (2) the notable change in the theoretical approach to international relations and security studies. Constructivist approaches to security studies took the lead from the rationalist and the liberal.<sup>5</sup> They started to introduce regional level of analysis and highlight the significance of ideas and culture in shaping of the security realm.<sup>6</sup>

### Motivation

The motivation for the research was both personal and professional. Initial orientation towards the identity and culture perspective in the Western Balkans conflict originated from personal observations and experience. A few details from the author’s biography are quite interesting. These details can shed some light on motivation for this research and why the identity seemed to be important. The author was born in country known as Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The author finished his education in a different country, named Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The author’s military career began in the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The author came to CGSC from yet another country, now known as Republic of Serbia. It would not be such an unusual story, but the interesting fact is that author has never changed his garrison. If the author’s grandfather were to show some of his personal documents, one could trace additional four home countries. Born in the Kingdom of Serbia, schooled in the Kingdom

of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and married in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The birth of his first child was in the Peoples Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>7</sup>

The same geographical area and almost the same group of people have changed names and together with names, part of their identity several times. In fact, three times in the last 20 years. Unbelievably eight times in the last 95 years. No one could resist the identity issue in these circumstances. Although, this short reflection refers to individual identity, it is easily applicable to collective identities in the region, as well.

Unfortunately, this could not match the suffering and horror of tragically involved individuals from ethnically mixed marriages or those that were fighting against their neighbors.

The civil war and break-up of a former home country struck the author as unprepared as the most of the population. His first impressions were that it was a large misunderstanding. Only seven percent of the Yugoslav population in the beginning of 1990s believed that some form of armed conflict was inescapable.<sup>8</sup> What kind of fear forced them to change their mind and take part in war? Under pressure of the breaking rules and uncertainty, people were forced to refer to something that is persistent to everyday change. Paradoxically, they turned to abstracts of nation, religion and culture. The people of the Western Balkans have found their temporary shelter in the field of religious differentiation. Religion is certainly an important manifestation of cultural identity. The initial standpoint of this thesis is that cultural identity based upon religion has facilitated conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo, but also enabled peaceful dissolution of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and later Montenegro.

## Qualifications

The author's professional and academic experience, closely tied to security issues, led him towards more serious research in the field of security. The author is an active Serbian Army Officer. His background of International security studies at Belgrade University and experience of a CGSC graduate qualifies him for this research. The MMAS program provides him with the opportunity to indulge a personal fascination with this topic, while concurrently developing professionally. It offers a unique position for research. Because of the MMAS thesis, the author will be better equipped to take an active part in the development of his country's security and future regional efforts for reconciliation.

## Topic and the Research Problem

### Topic

The topic of this thesis is cultural identity and regional security in the Western Balkans. The majority of literature focuses study directly on nationalism and "primordial hatreds"<sup>9</sup> in the Western Balkans and Balkans in general. However, this thesis argues that identity issue is also very important in this case, and attempts to reveal the nature of the connection between cultural identity and security in the Western Balkans. However, thesis examines the role of political elites and their particular influence on recent events.

### Research Problem Statement

Research problem is how to find the critical relation or connection between the cultural identity and regional security in the Western Balkans. Probably, the regional security of the Western Balkans is eligible as one of those problems that Laurence J.

Peter calls “so complex that you have to be highly intelligent and well informed just to be undecided about them.”<sup>10</sup> Fleming wrote about the European perception of the Balkans.

What makes the Balkans the Balkans, to the outside observer, is that they can neither be told apart nor put together. By this argument, one of the things that makes the Balkans all so very much the same is the fact that they are all concerned with demonstrating how it is that they are different from one another.<sup>11</sup>

This thesis respects this constant ambiguity between differences and similarities of peoples and cultures in the Western Balkans. This thesis does not see the cultural identity as the single cause of the previous conflicts in the Western Balkans. However, this research will try to prove that the political elites on all sides in recent conflicts misused cultural identity to mobilize their respective audiences for the conflict. Thesis describes the concern about the current process of security reform and reconciliation in the region, which does not treat the issue of the cultural identity adequately. Furthermore, development of the new regional cultural identity has the potential to facilitate the opposite process. If properly formatted, cultural identity hypothetically can become the tool for stabilizing the regional security. This approach possibly can relieve current pressure imposed on international security organizations assigned to keep the peace in the Western Balkans. The final rationale for this research is to discover how cultural identity can facilitate the handover of the security management to the regional actors alone.

### Importance and Significance

The results of this research are important from the sociological point of view and significant from scientific point of view. More than 20 million people are living in seven countries of the Western Balkans. Additional eight countries are bordering the region on land and in the sea. The Western Balkans is inescapable route from Europe to the Middle



East. The Balkans is the bridge between civilizations. Better understanding and mutual respect of political leaders and nations of the Western Balkans is sociologically important. It facilitates the process of reconciliation and proclaimed collective devotion to peace and progress.

The scientific significance of the study rests with its value for scholars and decision makers on different levels. For scholars, it offers the integration of several theoretical approaches for the purpose of investigation of cultural identity as a security issue. This study should systematize and integrate the knowledge in this field and enhance the understanding of the complexity of it. For decision makers, it offers some recommendations for future management of cultural identity in the region.

### Purpose

The purpose<sup>12</sup> of this case study will be to answer the question: “Is cultural identity critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans?” First, it will seek for connections between historical events, cultural identity and security. Following that, it will analyze how Western Balkans addresses cultural identity in the current process of security reform. Finally, it will examine the possibility of utilizing cultural identity in the future for the opposite purpose, preserving the peace in the region.

Definitions of the central phenomenon are below.

### General Definitions

#### Cultural Identity

After “nature,” “culture” is the second most difficult word in the English language to define and not just in English, but other languages as well. The social science uses

term “culture” in many different ways. Within the military, culture has its more materialistic definition.<sup>13</sup> For the purpose of this research, this thesis will adopt the following definition: “Culture: [is] A shared set of traditions, belief systems and behaviors.”<sup>14</sup> Questions about identity are most often defined as “who am I,” “who I do belong to,” and reflect what one thinks about self.<sup>15</sup> “Cultural identity is conscience about possession of particular cultural characteristics that are common to certain social group.”<sup>16</sup> is an acceptable definition of cultural identity.

### Regional Security

“Region” can have different meanings. From the perspective of Barry Buzan, region is defined in the following way:

Thus, by *region* we mean a spatially coherent territory composed of two or more states. *Subregion* means part of such a region, whether it involves more than one state (but fewer than all of the states in the region) or some transnational composition (some mix of states, parts of states, or both). *Microregion* refers to the subunit level within the boundaries of a state.<sup>17</sup>

This thesis assumes that Western Balkans is a subregion of Europe. Smaller parts of the Western Balkans, such as Kosovo, this thesis considers as microregions.

Security is “A term which denotes the absence of threats to scarce values.”<sup>18</sup> The prominent *Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* gives this short but persistent definition. Barry Buzan gave a more profound definition of security in the *International Affairs* magazine just before the tragic events in the Western Balkans.

Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence.<sup>19</sup>

In light of the first definition, regional security in the Western Balkans can be simplistically defined as absence of threats to any of the Western Balkan regional entities' scarce values. This thesis treats the threat-security dynamics in this case as internal to the region. This thesis will not consider the possible meaning of regional security as absence of threats that come from outside of the region.

### Western Balkans

“Western Balkans” was the term used to address politely the states that used to belong to the Former Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia. Later, European Union (EU) used it to address all of the Balkan states that still were not part of the European Union but declared their aspiration towards the membership. That means all former Yugoslav republics and Albania (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Officially, this term was used in the Declaration adopted after the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, Greece, on June 21, 2003.<sup>20</sup>

### Research Questions and Hypothesis

#### Central Question

Founded on initial research, the author proposes the following question: “Is cultural identity critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans?” It is the central research question of this thesis. The result of this research should be a clear answer to this question, which will reveal critical importance of cultural identity for regional security in the Western Balkans.

### Subquestions

Three subordinate research questions follow the central research question. These sub-questions are:

1. Is there a connection between crucible historical events, cultural identity and security in the western Balkans?
2. Is cultural identity adequately addressed in the current process of security reforms and cooperation in the Western Balkans?
3. Is it possible to utilize cultural identity in the Western Balkans for the advancement of regional security in the future?

### Hypothesis

After framing the research problem and questions in the described way, two possible hypotheses emerge. These are:

1. Yes, cultural identity is critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans.
2. No, cultural identity is not critically important for regional security in the western Balkans.

The authors' position in the beginning of the research is clearly in favor of the first hypothesis. His understanding of the problem suggests that cultural identity is critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans.

### Assumptions and Limitations

#### Assumptions

General assumptions for this research will be the following:

1. Security structure of the Western Balkans is anarchical. It means that there is no hegemon in the region.
2. There are no secret agendas of the Western Balkans states towards their political decisions to join the EU.
3. Western Balkans is following the tendency of the International system that is becoming more decentralized and regionalized after the Cold War.<sup>21</sup>

### Limitations

Limitations should further focus this research. Limitations of this research are classified as historical, theoretical, geographical, and limitations of research resources. Those limitations are:

1. Historically, this research will be restricted to crucible events that had considerable impact on cultural identity. Conflicts before the period of civil war in the Former Yugoslavia are addressed symbolically, in order not to turn this thesis into history paper.
2. Analysis is restricted to just one distinctive security sector and that is societal security sector.
3. Geographically, research covers only the region defined in this introduction as the Western Balkans.
4. This research was conducted at the unclassified level, using open source materials.

### Scope and Delimitations

The complexity of the security situation in the Western Balkans is considerable and justifies utilization of more than one theoretical model or one level of research. This thesis will use the theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC), theory of Security Sectors, and some elements of Identity theory. The scope will embrace the state and regional level of analysis. The individual level of analysis is intentionally omitted because it requires substantial psychological prerequisites.

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<sup>1</sup>JohnW. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 74-75.

<sup>2</sup>Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), 58.

<sup>3</sup>JohnW. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013), 61-63.

<sup>4</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Introduction, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Washington, DC: Basic Books, 1997), xiv.

<sup>5</sup>Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 5th ed. (New York: Paerson-Longman: 2005), 7.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Temporary name for Yugoslavia following the end of WWII, until 1947.

<sup>8</sup>Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 82.

<sup>9</sup>Primordial or ancient hatreds were introduced in Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

<sup>10</sup>Jeff Conklin Ph.D., "Wicked Problems and Social Complexity," "CogNexus Institute Homepage, <http://www.cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf> (accessed January 15, 2013).

<sup>11</sup>Katherine E. Fleming, "Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography," *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (2000): 1218-1233.

<sup>12</sup>The purpose statement is developed upon “purpose statement script” from Creswell, *Research Design*, 135.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 12 April 2001), defines “culture” as “A feature of the terrain that has been constructed by man. Included are such items as roads, buildings and canals; boundary lines; and, in broad sense, all names and legends on a map.”

<sup>14</sup>William D. Wunderle, “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power,” *Warfighters: Operational Realities* (RAND Technology and Applied Science Group Seminar, 17 November 2004), cited in William D. Wunderle, *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed forces deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 9.

<sup>15</sup>Dragan Kokovic, “Kulturni i etnicki identitet,” Novi Sad, Filozofski fakultet, [http://sociolog.rs/files/godisnjak\\_br03/dragan%20kokovic.pdf](http://sociolog.rs/files/godisnjak_br03/dragan%20kokovic.pdf) (accessed January 15, 2013), 119.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>17</sup>Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 19.

<sup>18</sup>Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1998), 490.

<sup>19</sup>Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century,” *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 431-451.

<sup>20</sup>EU-Western Balkans Summit, Declaration, (Thessaloniki, Greece, Summit 2001), [http://www.see-educoop.net/education\\_in/pdf/western-balkan-summit-oth-enl-t02.pdf](http://www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/western-balkan-summit-oth-enl-t02.pdf) (accessed January 15, 2013), 1.

<sup>21</sup>Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, in Preface of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), vii.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to carefully summarize and concisely evaluate standing writings on the research questions. The general overview establishes the need for a literature review and explains how the review was conducted. The chapter transparently explains the key words and databases used. Those interested in following or repeating this research should find sufficient traces that lead to data and sources. The next three sections are covering three groups of sources identified with the content and analytical approach. This grouping should relate to the subordinate research questions. First, the reader will become familiar with some historical sources that deal with the main events from the history of the Western Balkans. Following the historical part of the review, this chapter will present the most important theoretical frameworks, which will contribute the most in the analysis chapter. After the selected theoretical sources, the chapter synthesizes current perspectives on regional security, question of cultural identity and prospects for future security cooperation, based upon cultural issues. The summary concludes with the main points, establishes the literature gap, and identifies deficiencies.

#### General Overview

##### Purpose and Need for the Literature Review

This chapter attempts to establish a research outline that streams rationally from current understanding of the topic and “critical analysis of the literature.”<sup>1</sup> This literature review logically falls into the introduction, or as its extension. Because of its volume and



academic requirements, it constitutes a separate chapter. This thesis is attempting to shape this review as much “integrative”<sup>2</sup> as possible.

The need for this literature review is established because looking at the topic of regional security in the Western Balkans broadly, one might conclude there is too much literature. On the other hand, looking at the topic from a specific standpoint like the cultural identity perspective, some deficiencies are obvious. Nevertheless, it is more than easy to use these multiple sources selectively in order to portray the desired picture and this was the greatest challenge from the point of the literature review.

### Organization of Sources

In general, literature about the topic can be classified into four categories. Three categories are determined by the popular explanations of causes for recent wars of Yugoslav succession. Many journalists and some US politicians<sup>3</sup> believed that contemporary conflicts are in fact the renewed “ancient ethnic hatreds.”<sup>4</sup> The second commonly adopted belief is that those conflicts were the result of unfrozen “ancient clash of civilizations”<sup>5</sup> after the disappearance of communism ideology.<sup>6</sup> The third approach finds the outside interferers as the ones responsible for causing the war and dissolution in the Western Balkans, illustrating it usually with German premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.<sup>7</sup> Although, each of these source groups is valuable in its own way they represent the partial and incomplete picture and analysis of a relationship between the cultural identity and security in the Western Balkans. The fourth group of sources is more mature in its analysis. Leveraging on the new theoretical approaches developed after the Cold war as a significant milestone, they offer new perspectives on security in the Western Balkans.

In general, the majority of sources are identifying the cultural identity to be of significant importance, but denying its critical position in relation to security in the Western Balkans. Just a few sources examine the possibility of leveraging on the cultural identity for resolving the current security situation.

### Method and Key Words

This literature review is performed through usage of both, written and electronic resources. The main resources were the rich book deposit available at Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) and electronic databases accessible from CARL website. This thesis relied on the following library non-governmental data bases: “E-books by EBSCOHost,”<sup>8</sup> “Ebrary,”<sup>9</sup> “Country Watch,”<sup>10</sup> “CultureGrams,”<sup>11</sup> “JSTOR,”<sup>12</sup> and “Jane’s Sentinel Security Risk Assessments.”<sup>13</sup> This thesis relied on military and governmental databases such as “Joint Electronic Library”<sup>14</sup> and “CARL Catalog.”<sup>15</sup> Databases mentioned, may ask for additional log-on requirements. Among non-governmental databases, two were the most important—“RAND Corporation”<sup>16</sup> and “UNdata,”<sup>17</sup> both publicly accessible.

Main key words for searching tools were:

1. Western Balkans,
2. History of Yugoslavia,
3. Regional Security,
4. Culture, and
5. Identity.

### Historically Focused Sources

All the Western Balkan nations enjoy history; the more ancient, the better for the most of them. It is common to find that in their local history school textbooks Western Balkan nations tend to represent themselves as older than their neighbors. Although, all Western Balkan nations want to see or present themselves as greater than they really are, the fact is that they are all small nations with a rich but unfortunate history.<sup>18</sup> That requires selective use of sources depending on their reliability and scientific independence. Historically focused sources are presented in three groups according to the period and relevance. The key turning point and line of classification is the Existence of Yugoslavia.

#### Before Yugoslavia

Cultural identity is an abstract category. The first who identified the importance of abstract categories, especially the importance of fear in security and international relations was Thucydides in his famous *History of Peloponnesian War*. This prominent work of the “western historical tradition”<sup>19</sup> is incorporated into the reference list because it deals with both, rational and irrational causes of conflict. Interest is a realistic category that essentially refers to the economic issues within society or among different societies. Being essentially realistic, Thucydides considers the abstract categories such as fear and honor as equally important in security. “And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in.”<sup>20</sup> He repeats these words several times throughout the book. As well, his work deals with the wider region of the Balkans at the time it was considered the cradle of European civilization. Furthermore, it explains the conflict

among the states inhabited with ethnically and culturally similar population, giving the useful insights and explaining the Peloponnesian war as an internal conflict. Practically, for Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War is an equivalent of a civil war.

*The Palgrave Concise History Atlas of the Balkans* is a fabulous independent reference. Concise and resource rich texts explain the each one of the carefully developed historical maps giving the brief, but very clear picture, about significant historical events. The following paragraphs will reveal the basics about the medieval history of the subregion utilizing primarily the mentioned source. Note that not all of the contemporary countries existed in this period, but the roots of each of the future nations or ethnical groups exist. This valuable book identifies cultural influences under which Western Balkan medieval states developed. In their explanation for the *Map 5: Cultural*, Dennis E. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox emphasized that in order “to make sense of Balkan history, one must understand the cultural forces that historically operated in the region.”<sup>21</sup> Additionally, they explained, “culture operates on two levels- the civilizational and the ethno national.”<sup>22</sup> They also identified the influence of three different civilizations in the Balkans: The Eastern European or Orthodox, The Western European or Catholic and Islamic civilization.<sup>23</sup> For this research, the most important fact is that Hupchick and Cox define “the cultural fault lines”<sup>24</sup> as terrain in which these civilizations overlap, “intersect” or “converge,”<sup>25</sup> and where “the most dramatic human disturbances”<sup>26</sup> occur. The fault line between the Western and Eastern European civilization is defined in the following way:

Historically, the cultural fault line dividing the Western and Eastern European Civilization in the Balkans runs . . . through Serbia’s . . . Vojvodina province, the Slovenian border region separating Croatia and Serbia, all of Bosnia-

Hercegovina, to the Dalmatian-Montenegrin border and northern Albania along the Adriatic Sea.<sup>27</sup>

The fault line between the Eastern European and the Islamic civilization is defined as “a long, somewhat scythe-shaped swath cutting northwestward into the peninsula through Bulgaria, northern Greece, Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo, eventually intersecting the East-West European fault line in Bosnia Herzegovina and northern Albania.”<sup>28</sup> As one may notice in this book, the significant influence of the major religions and cultural spheres is already present at the time of the rise of South Slav medieval kingdoms. After their fall in the Middle Ages, ethnic groups will remain under influences that are more powerful. This book covers also the period of romantic nationalism and partial liberation of the Western Balkans between the early 19th and early 20th century. Main points about World War I are also covered in detail satisfactory for this research.

#### Period of Yugoslavia

Aleksa Djilas, a Serbian émigré to the United States, wrote the book *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953*. Being a son of Milovan Djilas, (Josip Broz Tito’s closest aide and later dissident), Aleksa Djilas was close to the events and forces that governed Yugoslavia until the 1990’s. He wrote the book from the position of Research Associate in the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. The main topic of the book is the national question in Yugoslavia. He isolated Serbs, Croats and the Communist Party as “three most important participants” in all Yugoslav crises. Mastering brilliantly on historical background of birth and development of Yugoslavia he discusses in detail questions like: Yugoslav unity, conflict between Croatian and Serbian national ideologies and the role of the Communist party in their

disputes. His evidence is thorough and extensive. Book is supported with more than forty pages of notes and twenty pages of bibliography. He begins with the origins of Yugoslavism among Croatian and Serbian intellectuals in the 19th century. He finds the creation of Croatian-Serbian coalition in Croatia in December 1905 as the most important event in the history of Croatian-Serbian relations. After that event, representatives of both nations were united around a “common national program” with unification as final goal.<sup>29</sup> He explains some deficiencies of First Yugoslavia and how the Communist Party later embraced the concept of Yugoslavism.<sup>30</sup> The book offers many details about the “discovering” of other Western Balkan nations. Many details about World War II and the period of communist governance are more than useful for understanding the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990’s. In one point in the Conclusion, he explained the role of religion in the Croatian-Serbian lasting dispute.

Cleavages between Serbian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism were not of crucial importance in the formation and preservation of national ideologies, although most advocates of Yugoslavism (and especially Yugoslav Communists) thought they were. As a rule, for Serbs the battles they had won (and lost) and for Croats the rulers they had had (and in some cases imagined they had had) were a much more important part of their national identity than were Orthodox and Catholic dogma and ritual.<sup>31</sup>

He concludes that Communists had false expectations about the decrease of church influence under Communist ideological pressure. They were wrong, as it would result in bringing Serbs and Croats more closely together. Although, in his book, Djilas failed to anticipate all future events his final thoughts are more than true. “Based on an ideology that proved utopian and on a power structure that was both undemocratic and bound to be inefficient and deteriorate, the Communist solution of the national question in Yugoslavia was destined to be only transient.”<sup>32</sup>

## Dissolution and Wars for the Yugoslav Succession

A reliable source for this period comes from the Croatian side. The author is Sabrina P. Ramet, and the book title is *The Three Yugoslavias: State building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Ramet based this book on her previous one: *Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia*.<sup>33</sup> The main topic of *The Three Yugoslavias* is history about three unsuccessful attempts to sustain the state of South Slavs. Wars for succession are also covered in sufficient detail. Similarly, Ramet does not see the reason for Yugoslav failure in “ancient hatreds” challenging the proponents of such ideas to cite “even one violent instance involving Serbs, Croats, or Bosniaks” in “ancient times.”<sup>34</sup> Her thesis is that the reason for the failures of Yugoslavia in each case happened due to incapability of Yugoslav governments to institute the rule of law and “political legitimacy” of these regimes. Ramet argues that accumulated problems of “economic and political deterioration”<sup>35</sup> developed gradually and became worse over time. In one point, the Serbian and Croatian public come to be more and more “receptive” to the “beguiling promises”<sup>36</sup> of their mainstream manipulators. She accuses the leaders of Serbia and Croatia for abusing the nationalist ideas for the purpose of retaining and building their personal power.<sup>37</sup> She also finds the reasons for violent dissolution in other factors such as urbanization and literacy.<sup>38</sup>

For better understanding of the topic, some of the testimonies of common people are useful. One of the prominent books with that type of content is *The Balkan Express: Fragments From the Other Side of War*. The author is a Croat journalist and novelist, Slavenka Drakulic. She expressed serious anger at the general European, in her view wrong, perception about conflicts in the Western Balkans.<sup>39</sup> Words of a certain V.D.

from Belgrade, cited in *The Social Construction of the Man, the State, and War* illustrate the mist surrounding the issue of identity. “I really don’t know what identity is, but certainly it is a powerful source of grievance, or explanation for grievance. Everybody believes that he was wronged in the former Yugoslavia.”<sup>40</sup>

Susan L. Woodward’s book, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* with its profound combination of factual and historical data gives the thorough documentation of the Yugoslav crisis. With its divergent insights, the book gives a new perspective on Yugoslav crisis. It is different and more comprehensive than the most of mainstream publications on the topic.

#### Theoretically Focused Sources

After the end of Cold War, a lot of optimism and good hope was expressed all around the globe. Most of the liberals were extremely optimistic. Some others remained on the pessimistic side. One of them was the leading world’s neorealist John J. Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer confirmed his position developed at the beginning of 1990’s, in his later article “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War” which he wrote for Richard K. Bet’s *Conflict After the Cold War*. Mearsheimer deduces that the bipolar system has the significant advantage over the multipolar system.<sup>41</sup> He illustrates that with comparison of relative peace in bipolar Europe from the Cold War Era, and compares it with multipolar Europe from 1914. He also identifies the problem of “hyper nationalism,”<sup>42</sup> and suggests the international community to keep it “at bay,” especially in Eastern Europe.

Nationalism has been contained during the Cold War, but it is likely to re-emerge once the Soviet and American forces leave the heart of Europe. It will be the force for trouble unless curbed. The teaching of honest national history is especially



important, since the teaching of false, chauvinist history is the main vehicle for spreading hyper nationalism.<sup>43</sup>

His conclusions about post-Cold War instability in the World prove to be correct but he and other realists as well as liberals failed to give a serviceable framework for the emerging security dynamics.

One of the alternate views on international security is the Copenhagen School of Security studies.<sup>44</sup> Changing circumstances in international relations between early 1980's and middle 1990's placed this school in the focus of attention because of the "debate on the collectivist goals of humanitarian intervention."<sup>45</sup> Certainly, one of the most prominent representatives of this school is Barry Buzan. He has introduced several innovative theoretical concepts. Three of them are considerably beneficial for the research topic of this thesis. These are: (1) concept of securitization, (2) concept of societal security, and (3) concept of regional security complex.

Buzan has cooperated with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde on the concept of securitization. The securitization theory is probably his most important and groundbreaking effort.<sup>46</sup> The securitization concept moved the limits of security studies, from its narrow focus on military threats to brand new, non-conventional issues. Environmental, economical, societal and other problems became important in the world of security studies.<sup>47</sup> Securitization is the process of constructing a new security threat out of a problem, even if no one before considered that problem a security issue. It encompasses five essential elements. These are (1) securitization actor, (2) securitization act, (3) functional actors, (4) audience, and (5) special measures.<sup>48</sup> Securitization actor is usually a person with significant social influence in the society or asocial group.

Securitization actor makes a securitization act, which is usually a speech act—talks about

an issue. Actor presents that issue as a serious security problem that puts into danger another reference object—value that needs protection. Functional actors reinforce the act and take some consequential actions. Audience observes and forms a certain opinion. Because of a successful process of securitization, society accepts some kind of “special measures.” Special measures often go beyond every day politics or even usual authorizations for use of force. Buzan calls the reverse process—desecuritization. This process is convenient in describing the conduct of certain political leaders on the ex-Yugoslav political scene at the time of dissolution.

Copenhagen School and Buzan are famous for their widening of the security. Buzan and others introduced new categories of security. In fact, they defined five different “security sectors.” These are political, military, economic, societal and environmental security sectors. Each of the security sectors has two main features. These features are (1) the nature of dominant relations within the sector, and (2) the referent object or the value that society protects. In the case of societal security, dominant relations are the relations between social groups. The main referent object in the social security sector is the collective identity.<sup>49</sup> Buzan defines the societal security, as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats.”<sup>50</sup> Buzan self-confessed that this concept was at first developed in reaction to post–Cold War national and ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe.<sup>51</sup> This unlocked the study of “identity security”<sup>52</sup> and pointed to cases where national minorities were in jeopardy.<sup>53</sup> Bill McSweeney sharply responded to the views Buzan expressed. In his criticism, McSweeney argues that identity as social imaginary construct is by nature highly variable, and therefore one cannot treat it as an object.<sup>54</sup> Importance of a societal

security concept for this thesis rests with the fact that theorists from Copenhagen School have developed an analytical framework for effective understanding of “interrelation between identity and security.”<sup>55</sup>

In his book *People, States and Fear*, Buzan argues, “security is a relational phenomenon.”<sup>56</sup> His assumption is that one cannot comprehend the particular national security of any state without considerations of security interdependence with which it is surrounded. He is attempting to fill the gap between the state and international system with regions.<sup>57</sup> He gives the definition of a security complex. “A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”<sup>58</sup>

In another book, *Regions and Powers*, Buzan introduces the term Regional Security Complex (RSC) and elaborates on the “essential structure” of an RSC. An RSC has to have boundary,<sup>59</sup> (2) anarchic structure,<sup>60</sup> (3) polarity of power,<sup>61</sup> and (4) social construction,<sup>62</sup> which covers the patterns of amity and enmity among the units. These patterns of amity and enmity among units are the key for further classification of RSCs into three categories. These categories are (1) conflict formation, (2) security regime and (3) security community.<sup>63</sup> This concept will contribute to the second subordinate research question in analyzing the current security dynamics in the Western Balkans.

#### Analytically Focused Sources

Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic and Predrag Petrovic, edited a very comprehensive analysis of current security reform in the Western Balkans under title *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*. Together with other research fellows, they

analyzed in detail major strategic documents. What is particularly useful is their analysis of perceived threats in each of the security sectors according to Buzan's framework.

This study, together with the *Almanac of the Security Sector Oversight in the Western Balkans 2012*, will contribute the most in forming a clear picture about current security reform in the Western Balkans with focus on the societal sector.

Unavoidable author in the field of identity research in the Balkans is Marija Todorova. She based his famous book, *Imagining the Balkans*, on a gorgeous collection of travelogues, diplomatic records, academic surveys. She explains how the image of the Balkans was constructed as troublesome within the European intellectual tradition and how that discourse is still transmitted.

Cvete Koneska, in the *Western Balkan Security Observer* magazine, published the article "Regional Identity: The Missing Element in Western Balkans Security Cooperation." Her paper focuses on the contemporary regional security cooperation in the Western Balkans. She is interested in the reasons behind the "limited progress of regional initiatives." She is surprised that despite the existing practical necessities and external financial support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, there is no serious progress. She argues that part of the reason for this situation is "omitted regional identity." She describes the regional identity as "a required component for transferring the necessary loyalties to any social group."

regional cooperation is perceived in exclusively instrumental terms, as a means to an end, while each state in the region aims to cast off its Balkan skin and adopt a new European look. Emphasis is placed on security, as a distinct and more sensitive area of cooperation, related more to perceptions, trust and rhetoric than the more functional fields of economic or trade.<sup>64</sup>

This view offers an unexpected path and that is reformulation of regional identity in the Western Balkans. Because it is so close to the idea of Yugoslavism, this topic is still a taboo in the region. The *Western Balkan Security Observer* magazine, proves to be an amazing source of serious analysis of the current security issues in the region. This thesis prizes the series of articles published on societal security and identity in the Western Balkans, especially those of Filip Ejodus and Branka Panic

One Serbian author has gone further in the quantitative analysis. Ljubisa Mitrovic wrote a paper “Regional Identity and Actors Relations Towards Processes of Globalization, Regionalization and Euro-integration of the Balkans.” The paper is an illustration of a sociological research within the project “Cultural and ethnical relations in the Balkans – possibilities for regional and European integration. He begins with common truth that individuals and social groups have the “need for self-identification.”<sup>65</sup> Further he argues that building the identity as a process of maturing for the individuals as well as for groups.<sup>66</sup> In his analysis about attitudes and perception during numerous surveys, he noticed lot of controversies and contradictory opinions connected with possible new regional identity. He concludes about difficulties in the process of making of a new regional identity in the Western Balkans. He articulated the importance of appropriate behavior of political elites and multinational factors.

### Chapter Summary

General conclusion about written material is that indirectly, numerous works are addressing the question of cultural identity. The main deficiency in the literature is that there are no books that specifically talk about the topic. All attempts to address the

question of cultural identity are in process of research. Finished works are mostly articles or research reviews.

This thesis will try to fill that gap with combining the existing literature and synthesizing these sources with selected theoretical and analytical tools. Initial perceptions about the importance of cultural identity are changed. Some other security factors seem to be more decisively involved in catalyzing the recent conflict in the Western Balkans. Cultural identity played significant role in mobilizing the public and members of ethnic communities for active participation in conflict.

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<sup>1</sup>Richard J. Torraco, "Writing Integrative Literature Reviews: Guidelines and Principles," *Human Resource Development Review* 4, no. 3 (September 2005): 356-367.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 356. Richard Torraco considers "the integrative literature review" to be "a form of research that reviews, critiques and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way such that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated."

<sup>3</sup>Primarily American President Bill Clinton under the influence of Robert D. Kaplan and his book *The Balkan Ghosts*.

<sup>4</sup>Robert D. Kaplan, "Reading Too Much Into a Book," *New York Times*, June 13, 1999, 4-17.

<sup>5</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Carl Cavanagh Hodge, "Botching the Balkans: Germany's Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia," *Ethics and International Affairs* 12, no. 1 (1998): 1.

<sup>8</sup>Accessible at following link: <http://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?authtype=ip,uid&profile=ehost&defaultdb=nlebk>.

<sup>9</sup>Accessible at following link: <http://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/carl>

<sup>10</sup>Accessible at following link: <http://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=http://www.countrywatch.com/ip>.

<sup>11</sup> Accessible at following link: <http://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=http://online.culturegrams.com/>.

<sup>12</sup> Accessible at following link: <http://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=http://www.jstor.org/>.

<sup>13</sup> Accessible at following link: <https://lumen.cgscarl.com/login?url=https://janes.ihs.com/Default.aspx?Category=JMSA>.

<sup>14</sup> Accessible at following link: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s\\_index.html](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html).

<sup>15</sup> Accessible at following link: <http://comarms.ipac.dynixasp.com/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=carlcgsc&reloadxsl=true#focus>.

<sup>16</sup> Accessible at following link: <http://www.rand.org/index.html>.

<sup>17</sup> Accessible at following link: <http://data.un.org/>.

<sup>18</sup> Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 15.

<sup>19</sup> Thucydides, "History of the Peloponnesian War," in *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Touchstone, 1998), back cover page.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>21</sup> Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 12.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Djilas, 34.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 186.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 187.

<sup>33</sup>Sabrina P. Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias: State Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), xiii.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 597.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 603.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 604.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Slavenka Drakulic, *Balkan Express: Fragments From the Other Side of War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), 2-3.

<sup>40</sup>Franke Wilmer, *The Social Construction of the Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in the Former Yugoslavia* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 81.

<sup>41</sup>John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," in the Introduction for Richard K. Bates, *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2009), 19-20.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 33.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>The Copenhagen School grew partly out of the 1980s debates about widening and security, and partly out of a late Cold War discussion about regional security as something reflecting indigenous dynamics additional to superpower interventionism. Whether or not this focus on the regional level should count as widening from the core ISS literature, or as something mainly within it, is arguable. But in terms of the widening/deepening debate, the most distinctive contributions of the Copenhagen School have been the concepts of societal security and securitization.

<sup>45</sup>Martin Griffiths, Steven C. Roach, and Solomon M. Scott, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (London, UK: Routledge, 2009), 212.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 221.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 222.



<sup>48</sup>Securitization “frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” and a spectrum can therefore be defined as ranging public issues from the non-politicized (“the state does not deal with it”), through politicized (“the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance”) to securitization (in which case an issue is no longer debated as a political question, but dealt with at an accelerated pace and in ways that may violate normal legal and social rules).

<sup>49</sup>Branka Panic, “Societal Security—Security and Identity,” *Western Balkan Security Observer* 13 (April-June 2009): 31.

<sup>50</sup>Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, “Defining–Redefining Security,” International Studies Compendium Project, [http://www.isacompendium.com/public/tocnode?query=Defining%E2%80%93Redefining+Security&widen=1&result\\_number=1&from=search&id=g9781444336597\\_yr2012\\_chunk\\_g97814443365976\\_ss1-1&type=std&fuzzy=0&slop=1](http://www.isacompendium.com/public/tocnode?query=Defining%E2%80%93Redefining+Security&widen=1&result_number=1&from=search&id=g9781444336597_yr2012_chunk_g97814443365976_ss1-1&type=std&fuzzy=0&slop=1) (accessed February 2, 2013).

<sup>51</sup>It was equally the response to the fears of immigration and integration within Western Europe.

<sup>52</sup>The Copenhagen School explicitly constituted this as a middle position between traditionalist state-centrism on the one hand and equally traditional and critical security studies’ calls for “individual” or “global security” on the other.

<sup>53</sup>Buzan and Hansen, “Defining–Redefining Security.”

<sup>54</sup>Panic, “Societal Security—Security and Identity,” 34.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 29.

<sup>56</sup>Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies In the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd.ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 186.

<sup>57</sup>In the Cold War era that was not the case. All analysis were performed on two levels--state level and international level.

<sup>58</sup>Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 190.

<sup>59</sup>The boundary distinguishes the region from its neighbors.

<sup>60</sup>Anarchic structure assumes that there are two or more units within the RSC and that no one is in “charge.”

<sup>61</sup>This refers to distribution of power among the units. RSC can be unipolar, bipolar or multipolar.

<sup>62</sup>Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 53.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, 53-54.

<sup>64</sup>Cvete Koneska, "Regional Identity: The Missing Element in Western Balkans Security Cooperation," *Western Balkans Security Observer* 7-8 (October 2007-March 2008): 83-84.

<sup>65</sup>Ljubisa Mitrovic, "*Regionalni identitet i odnos aktera prema procesima globalizacije, regionalizacije i evrointegracije Balkana*" (Research report, University of Nis, 2003), 31.

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to present in detail the specific research techniques and methods applied to the research problem. It provides the reader with both, general understanding of the combination of selected research approaches used, and an understanding of the specific way of adapting these approaches for this research. This chapter has three sections. The first section explains the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen methodology. The second section illuminates, bit by bit, how the research process progressed in answering all the research questions. It describes the process of collecting, organizing, analyzing, and interpreting of the evidence found. Finally, the third section explicates major challenges encountered during research and thesis development.

#### Selection of Tools

##### Qualitative Nature of Research

This research is qualitative and descriptive in its nature. This choice is appropriate in regard to the various reasons. First, one should use qualitative research for those problems that require exploration, but identified variables “cannot be easily measured.”<sup>1</sup> The second reason is the presence of “silenced voices”<sup>2</sup> that are surrounding this topic. The qualitative research better fits the intriguing nature of this topic. The third reason is more practical. Qualitative research allows an author a more flexible writing style. The author can easily combine historical and analytical data with elements of personal and mythical layers. The following paragraphs present one of possible definitions of qualitative research and its characteristics.

## Definition and Characteristics of Qualitative Research

Denzin and Lincoln, in their *SAGE handbook of Qualitative Research*, developed the “evolving definition” of the qualitative research.<sup>3</sup>

Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative research study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.<sup>4</sup>

Indicated definition of qualitative research is applicable for this thesis, because essentially, this research attempts to interpret the phenomena of recent insecurity and conflict in the Western Balkans region from the cultural perspective. Particularly useful for this thesis is the potential of qualitative research “to transform the world.”<sup>5</sup>

Ultimately, one of the goals of this research is to come up with practical recommendations for future actions and measures that can promote security in the Western Balkan region and bring positive change.

This thesis possesses almost all of the general characteristics of the qualitative research such as specific selection of instruments, gathering of multiple forms of data, complex reasoning, emergent design, “reflexivity” and “holistic account.”<sup>6</sup> This research, like most of qualitative studies, puts the researcher in the position of the main research instrument.<sup>7</sup> Examination of documents and texts about the topic was the primary method of gathering and later interpreting the evidence. This research does not use surveys and questionnaires, but in some points, it deduces from the interpretation of other researcher’s materials. After the review of all available forms of data, they were organized into types. For example, all of the literature is categorized into three general groups of sources,

(1) historical sources, (2) theoretical tools, and (3) analytical sources. The research process for this thesis was developed during the process of collection of data. The preliminary research plan was modified as the research question changed. According to Wolcott, researchers “position themselves” in a qualitative research. That means to express expectations from the study, convey historical background and some possible work and cultural experiences.<sup>8</sup> This thesis presents the information and its possible influence on reasoning in Motivation and Qualification sections in the Introduction chapter. Finally, this thesis reports about different perspectives, in attempt to identify as many factors as possible.

### Case Study as Qualitative Approach

Creswell and other experts of the social research methodology suggest at least five forms of qualitative studies.<sup>9</sup> The rational choice of primary methodology for this research was the case study research. According to Creswell, this methodological design approach is very popular in social and political science. It becomes clearer having in mind the definition of the case study given by Creswell. “Case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real life, contemporary bounded system (a *case*) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving *multiple sources of information* . . . and reports a *case description* and *case themes*.”<sup>10</sup> “Case” in this research is the relationship between cultural identity and regional security in the Western Balkans. Cultural identity is that specific issue or aspect within the wider problem of regional security in the Western Balkans. This case study intends to understand how cultural identity affects or how it is embedded in the problem of regional security in the Western Balkans. That being said,

one may conclude that this case study belongs to the specific category known as “instrumental case.”<sup>11</sup>

### Strengths and Weaknesses of Chosen Methodology

The choice of qualitative study puts some requirements before the researcher. These requirements, according to their effect on writing, reflect the strength and weaknesses of this kind of approach. There are two major strengths of the qualitative and descriptive oriented methodology. First, it allows acting without firm guidelines. That tolerates adaptation and changing of procedures if required.<sup>12</sup> Second, it permits writing of long paragraphs that are more suitable for the author’s reflection on the evidence, and possible reduction of extensive data to reasonable categories.<sup>13</sup> Opposing these freedoms a few weaknesses stand out, like committing extensive time for gathering information and engaging in the time-consuming process of data analysis.<sup>14</sup> Lastly, this research presents just one person’s “encounter” with a relatively complex problem.<sup>15</sup>

### Process of Designing

#### Preliminary Considerations

Rationale for selecting methodology for this research covered preliminary considerations such as (1) initial limitations, (2) researcher’s personal background and interests, (3) selection of sources, (4) selection of useful theories, (5) possible strengths versus weaknesses, (6) overall structure of research, and (7) writing format. This thesis already discussed the initial limitations and the researcher’s personal background and interests in the chapter 1--Introduction. In the chapter 2--Literature review, reader can find selection of sources and useful theories. In previous paragraphs, this chapter already

argued the possible strengths and weaknesses of selected methodological approach. The next two paragraphs give details about the overall structure of research and writing format.

This thesis follows the general process of a scientific method. The scientific method, in its structure, includes (1) the research problem, (2) possible hypotheses, (3) the process data collection, (4) the analysis, and (5) the discussion of findings.<sup>16</sup> This thesis fits within the previously mentioned structure. This thesis has five chapters. Chapter 1--introduction displays the research problem and offers two possible hypotheses as preliminary solutions. Chapter 2--Literature review, explains the process of data collection, focusing on the primary sources and current writings on the topic. Chapter 3--methodology, displays the research tools used. Chapter 4--analysis, contributes with the breakdown of evidence and data through chosen theoretical lenses. Chapter 5 gives the final interpretation of findings from previous chapters and offers conclusions and recommendations.

### Phases and Steps in the Process

Data gathering phase. Phase started with search for relevant sources. Beside the key words listed in the chapter 2, bibliography and reference lists from books and sources initially acquired were the most useful help. Skimming of books followed the step of compiling what seemed to be an appropriate working list of references. Skimming a book helps to “determine its general content and organization,” and above all saves time.<sup>17</sup> Having in mind that not all books and articles dealing with the topic of this research will contribute equally, sources were the subject of evaluation of certain criteria for their

relevance. Evaluation criteria were (1) depth of coverage, (2) currency, (3) bias, (4) variety of viewpoints, and (5) ease of reading.<sup>18</sup>

The next critical phase of research was the process of organizing the data. Primary focus was on effective note taking, in order to make an efficient record of worthwhile citations and ideas. Each note and idea, from the very beginning of the research, has found its place within the appropriate chapter where it can contribute the most. Within the chapters, notes were further divided according to the respective research question. After reaching the phase of data analysis, paper notes were replaced with electronic notes, directly in the draft of the appropriate chapter.

Analyzing data was the most important and challenging phase of the research. The following paragraphs will explain in detail the flow of the analysis process. The quest for an ultimate answer to the main research question, “Is cultural identity critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans?” rests on comprehensive analysis of research material. Analysis followed the research sub-questions, and three critical variables. Three critical variables of cultural identity are (1) ethnicity, (2) language, and (3) religion. Analytical frameworks such as securitization theory, regional security complex theory and societal security sector model help in explanation of security dynamics within the Western Balkans.

In order to answer the first research sub-question, “Is there a connection between crucible historical events, cultural identity and security in the western Balkans?” the first part of the analysis chapter examines selected events from history through the lens of critical variables. The focus is on the relationship between each selected event from the past and cultural identity manifestations. Specifically, securitization theory will help to



describe the role of language in the recent conflict in the Western Balkans. Hopefully, the answer on this question will clarify the nature of relationships and offer possible patterns for conclusions about the future.

For giving the answer to the second research sub-question, “Is cultural identity adequately addressed in the current process of security reforms and cooperation in the Western Balkans?” the second part of chapter 4, evaluates current stage of security reforms in the region. The process of evaluation encompasses examination of current strategic documents of the countries in the region. It looks for indicators that will show the importance of the cultural identity for the regional security in perception of respective countries. It utilizes the concept of the regional security complex to judge about the Western Balkans eligibility for further analysis through the lens of societal security sector analysis and conclusion about current “security constellation” in the region.

To answer the third research sub-question, “Is it possible to utilize cultural identity in the Western Balkans for the advancement of regional security in the future?,” the third part of chapter 2 gazes over current cooperation initiatives and weighs at what level they are imposed on the region from the outside, assuming that only internally initiated cooperation can be beneficial for a longer time. It examines the problems of regional identity that western Balkan “enjoys” in Europe and throughout the world and how that can be changed.

The final interpretation of data has its place in the chapter 5. Conclusions and recommendations will give the ultimate answer on the central research question, and link the intuitive interpretation with larger research literature that exists already. Conclusions will summarize all relevant lessons learned from the Western Balkans about the

relationship between cultural identity and security in this region. Recommendations should offer practical solutions for reconciliation and security advancement in the Western Balkans based upon cultural identity on the regional level.

### Challenges

#### English as a Second Language

English as a second language was one of the significant challenges during this research. Fortunately, varieties of tools were available to mitigate this challenge. First, the academic environment of CGSC that fosters proper language use. Second, various writing assignments during the year contributed to the improvement of English in this thesis. Finally, availability of committee members, instructors and colleagues willing to proof read was good fortune.

#### Ethical Challenges

Ethical challenges appeared in the phase of data analysis. Three ethical issues emerged. The first issue was to avoid siding with sources from one side in recent conflicts. The second issue was to escape from the trap of disclosing only positive results. Both were addressed with reporting of multiple perspectives and contrary findings. In the phase of data interpretation and during the writing of the thesis, the issue of communicating in direct, appropriate English language was also present. Following the guidance of the committee and respected methodological sources were sufficient to mitigate this issue. Finally, the third ethical challenge of this thesis was “the map issue.” The maps are often the tool for the argument in Balkan disagreements. That is the only reason why this thesis avoids use of maps.

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- <sup>1</sup>Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 48.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>3</sup>Ibid., 43.
- <sup>4</sup>Norman. K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2011), 1-19.
- <sup>5</sup>Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 44.
- <sup>6</sup>Ibid., 45-47.
- <sup>7</sup>Ibid., 46.
- <sup>8</sup>Harry F. Walcott, *Ethnography Lessons: A Primer* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2010), 36.
- <sup>9</sup>Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 7-12. Those five are: narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case study.
- <sup>10</sup>Ibid., 97.
- <sup>11</sup>Robert E. Stake, *The Art of Case Study Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 97.
- <sup>12</sup>Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 49.
- <sup>13</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>14</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid., 237.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid., 50.
- <sup>17</sup>Stephen Weidenborner and Domenick Caruso, *Writing Research Papers: A Guide to the Process*, 6th ed. (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001), 108-109.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid., 109-114.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to “present, explain, analyze and interpret” the evidence found in literature and shaped with chosen methodology.<sup>1</sup> It will “discuss the interrelationships” between selected evidence and their relations to central and subordinate research questions.<sup>2</sup> The structure of chapter 4 follows the structure of research questions. chapter 4 has four sub-chapters. Sub-chapters relate to subordinate and main research questions.

“Historical Events that Shaped the Cultural Map of the Western Balkans” seeks to answer the first research subquestion: “Is there a connection between crucible historical events, cultural identity and security in the western Balkans?” Under subtitle “Societal Security Sector in the Western Balkans Security Sub-Complex,” this thesis examines the current significance of cultural identity from the perspective of the security reform and strategic documents in the region. In other words, it should answer the second research sub-question or “Is cultural identity adequately addressed in the current process of security reforms and cooperation in the Western Balkans?” In “Cultural Identity and Future Cooperation,” this thesis attempts to give the answer to the third research sub-question or “Is it possible to utilize cultural identity in the Western Balkans for the advancement of regional security in the future?” The summary section will comprise the evidence from first three sections and offer the answer to the central research question or “Is cultural identity critically important for regional security in the Western Balkans?” Finally, chapter 4 plays the role in preparing the reader for conclusions and recommendations exposed in chapter 5.

### Historical Events That Shaped the Cultural Map of the Western Balkans

The selection of events described in following part of the thesis matches the specific criteria. This criterion explanation is “evident existence of the strong connection between the historical event and its consequences on one or more of the main cultural manifestations (1) ethnicity, (2) religion, and (3) language.<sup>3</sup> In other words, this sub-chapter presents only the events that had significant impact on religious, ethnical or lingual identity of the populations of the Western Balkans. Emphasis is given to the question of use of language in the process of national engineering.<sup>4</sup>

Often, the key players, in relatively significant historical events in the region, were outside actors. In addition, sometimes their actions did not have tremendous cultural influence on populations of Western Balkans. The conflicts between the Habsburg and the Russian Empire against the Ottoman Empire in 17th and 18th century are good examples.<sup>5</sup>

### Division between Eastern and Western Christian Church

Certainly, one of the most important events in the process of shaping the European cultural map, and particularly that of Western Balkans, was the adoption of Christianity as the state religion of the Roman Empire. It happened in 380 C.E. under Emperor Theodosius.<sup>6</sup> During the period between 380 C.E. and 800 C.E., almost the entire Balkan Peninsula adopted Christianity as their new faith. This process was willing because there was a strong desire of small principalities to be accepted as equals in Constantinople and Rome’s court. Division between the Christian church into Western and Eastern in 1054<sup>7</sup> just confirmed the border between two parts of the biggest empire.

Land borders between these two giants went through today's Bosnia. It marked the faith of this region to the present and probably will continue to influence its future.

### The Rise and Fall of Medieval Kingdoms in the Western Balkans

The medieval period in the Western Balkans set up the stage for future national identities of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. The division of the Christian church, and geography put the Croatian lands under predominantly Catholic influence. Similarly, Serbian lands were mostly under influence of the Byzantine Empire and the Orthodox Church. Bosnia always was in the middle, equally influenced from East and West.<sup>8</sup> Predominantly peasant populations inhabited the medieval states of Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia. The ruling class in this medieval period was somehow separate from the commoners. Often more exposed to foreign influences, these nobles sometimes spoke even different languages than the commons or peasants. There was no strong national feeling in any of these medieval states. It was evident at the time of their fall. Their aristocratic elites were unable to unite and find higher cause for persistent fighting. Divided internally, the medieval states of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia fell under foreign rule. However, unreliable historiography about the period before 1000 C.E. and later simplification of historical events from the period between 1000 C.E and 1400 C.E., opened the possibility for speculations and disputes in the future. The rise and development of the South Slav kingdoms in the Western Balkans is very interesting. However, the following paragraphs will primarily focus on the fall of these kingdoms in the light of major religious and cultural influences from outside. The rationale for this approach is to limit the volume of this chapter and to focus the reader's attention to external influences, which are inseparable from the events in the sub-region.

The rise and fall of Croatia. The rise of medieval Croatia in the period between the 10th and 12th century was heavily influenced with three mighty neighbors on land-- the Holy Roman empire, Hungary and the Byzantine Empire and one on the sea-- Venice.<sup>9</sup> Skillful Croatian kings managed to expand their influence and territories over the territory of today's Croatia, and partially Bosnia. The decline of Byzantine influence in Dalmatia allowed them to become a competitor to Venice in matters of trade on the Adriatic Sea. One of the highlights of this part of Croatian history was the successful defense against Bulgarian invasion. More than two centuries of successful and autonomous rule over the Dalmatian and Pannonian Croatia ended with crown-heir crisis caused by two kings without male successors.<sup>10</sup> The death of king Zvonimir, and unrest between the noblemen triggered Hungarian intervention. Hungarian attacks ended after the written agreement known as the *Pacta Conventa*.<sup>11</sup> In 1102, the Croatian notables agreed to recognize the sovereignty of the Hungarian monarch in exchange of holding some degree of local political autonomy inside Croatia. Although, some recent scholarship demonstrated serious doubts about the content of this controversial agreement, Hupchick and Cox concluded: "In any event, after 1102 the history and fate of Croatia became linked to those of Hungary and Central Europe until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century."<sup>12</sup> The population of Croatia was predominantly Catholic. Influx of Orthodox Christianity occurred with the establishment of the Croatian-Slavonian Military border in 16th and 17th century. In the case of Croatia, the myth about powerful medieval kings and *Pacta Conventa* is very important. For the Croats, the *Pacta Conventa* myth indicates that history chose the Croatian nation, because the Croats could preserve their statehood

for a thousand years. The Croats believe that adoption of Roman Catholicism made them more unwarlike, more truthful and just in their dealings with neighbors.<sup>13</sup>

The rise and fall of Bosnia. After shifting from Croatian hands to Hungary and later, to the resurrected Byzantine Empire, independent Bosnia emerged finally in 1180. This rise occurred under a ruler known as Kulin. Its peak of power occurred under the dynasty of Kontromanich. It is very important to notice the existence of “religious particularism”<sup>14</sup> in medieval Bosnia--Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Bogumilism. The Bogumilism was not a unique faith for Bosnia, but it took strongest roots there. This religious movement and Bosnian rulers were closely tied together. Although, Roman Catholic in the nature of its dogma, Bogumilism rejected the “papal control.”<sup>15</sup>

Franciscan missionaries were sent to reassert papal authority in Bosnia. Kontromanich, originally Orthodox, converted to Catholicism and, from that moment on, all Bosnian rulers were Roman Catholic. Despite the missionaries’ success with the rulers, many of the Bosnian local nobility and population persisted in their autonomous Bosnian faith or in Orthodoxy.<sup>16</sup>

After Tvrtko Kotromanich, who successfully consolidated the Bosnian territories and claimed to be the king of Bosnia and Serbia because of his ancestry, no successor will be strong enough to efficiently control the “independent-minded” local lords.<sup>17</sup> Between 1458 and 1461, Bosnia will finally fall into the hands of Ottoman Empire.<sup>18</sup> Until the arrival of Austro-Hungarian troops in 19th century, it remained under the strong influence of the Ottoman Empire and Islam tradition. Bogomils disappeared completely. The significant part of Christian (and possibly Bogomil) population adopted the new faith--Islam, and maintained the tradition of religious particularism.<sup>19</sup>

The rise and fall of Serbia. The first Serbian medieval state, with serious influence on the Balkans, emerged in the Raska region. Stefan I Nemanja succeeded in bonding,



previously separate territories, into one consolidated state. He unified the territories of Raska, Zeta, Kosovo, today's Northern Albania and Eastern Serbia. The conflict between his two sons, Vukan and Stefan II, depicts the clash of influences between the East and the West. Hungarians strongly supported Vukan, which meant that he would take Serbia towards the Catholic faith. On the other side, Bulgarians and Byzantines at some extent supported Stefan II. The outcome of this conflict was in favor of Stefan II. The key role in peacemaking, and future cultural orientation of Serbia towards the east, played their youngest, saintly brother Sava. As in most western kingdoms at the time, the immersion of religion in the lives of people was very strong. At the peak of Serbian conquest, only Serbian Emperor Stefan Dushan, proclaimed the Serbian Archbishop, to be Patriarch in 1346. The Serbian Patriarch, seated at Pec, became equal of the Greek Patriarchs to the south.<sup>20</sup> Following the greatest success, fast decline approached. Dushan's successor was too weak to control the powerful aristocracy. Ottoman conquest once again faced the disunited opponent. The last attempt to prevent invasion was the gathering of the "Pan-Serbian" army under Prince Lazar united with Bosnian, Albanian and Wallachian allies.<sup>21</sup> In 1389, they fought the Kosovo Battle against Sultan Murad. Defeat was not decisive, but prevented remaining Serbs from any sort of organized resistance. Following Constantinople, Belgrade fell in 1456, and that marked the fall of the Serbian kingdom under the Ottoman rule until the 19th century. The Kosovo Battle produced a myth that played tremendously important role in the history of the Serbian people. It combined ideas of the chosen and heavenly nation, belonging to the greater Christian Orthodox community and holy mission of protecting of Christian Europe against Islamic invasion. It maintained its presence in everyday life through oral tradition. The Kosovo Battle myth

became one of the major pillars for the safeguarding and refinement of Serbian culture. Serbian principality of Zeta was under nominal rule of the Ottoman Empire from the 14th to the 19th century. Thanks to its mountainous terrain, it managed to evade tight Ottoman control. Soon it would become known as Montenegro.<sup>22</sup>

### Ottoman Conquest and Pacification of the Balkans.

Ottoman conquest of the Balkans was mostly over in 1479.<sup>23</sup> Until the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire would enjoy undisputed rule in the Western Balkans.<sup>24</sup> Ottoman domination over the Western Balkans in a cultural sense was significantly marked with *millet* organization. Ottomans practiced religiously based law or theocratic governance.<sup>25</sup> In practice, Ottomans did not enforce adoption of Islam as mandatory. The Sultan's rationale was that conquered people would remain peaceful if they kept their own faith. Ottomans had respect for Christian faith. Sharia law only applies to Muslims. That is why Ottomans formed the millet system.<sup>26</sup> In the *millet* system, a few recognized religious groups were granted authority within their community to enforce their own religious laws.<sup>27</sup> Probably the most important *millet* for the Ottomans was the Orthodox *millet*.<sup>28</sup> *Millet* involved the idea of nation but differently than it was practiced in the West. "Until the close of the 18th century, *millet* affiliation--religious belief--was the fundamental source of group identity among all of the Empire's Balkan subjects."<sup>29</sup> Ethnicity or nationality was not important. This form of dealing with religious and ethnic issues was one of the most efficient methods of pacification in the Western Balkans.

### Establishment of the Croatian Military Border

The Habsburgs established the Croatian Military Border known as *Krajina* in 1538.<sup>30</sup> They also designated Slavonia-Vojvodina as the bordering zone in 1699.<sup>31</sup> Following the Ottoman retaliation after supporting the Habsburg attacks, Serbs fled north. Numerous Serbian refugees settled on these borders after migrating from Ottoman rule.<sup>32</sup> These migrations brought Serbs into traditionally Croatian and Catholic lands. Serbian cultural identity remained intact because of Habsburg King Leopold. Leopold granted new populace with autonomous Serbian Orthodox archbishopric.<sup>33</sup> Despite the differences, there is no evidence about conflicts among these diverse populations in this period. Certainly, the common language and common enemy (Ottomans) played a significant role in maintaining positive dynamics between Croatian and Serbian people.

### Liberation of Serbia and Montenegro

Western Balkans imported European romantic nationalism in the beginning of the 19th century.<sup>34</sup> The weakened Ottoman Empire was the perfect playground for Austrian and Russian supported national engineering of small Balkan nations.<sup>35</sup> Serbs were the least immune to that. Initially, the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 began because of economic grievance of the wider population. Very soon, it transmuted to a romantic story of the nation building process. Looking to contemporary European nations, Serbs tried to build a nation-state. Unfortunately, instead of a nation emerging from long state tradition, their nation was to be born simultaneously with the state. The lack of history of statehood in the previous 500 years under Ottomans was apparent. Myths mentioned earlier will become the substitute for history.<sup>36</sup> Serbia became widely known for its rich oral tradition with gratitude to Vuk Karadjic. The oral traditions have roots in the 15th century and rose

to their peak in the 19th century. Just at that time, Vuk Karadzic collected and published most of the orally preserved poems.<sup>37</sup> Historian Alexander Greenawalt identified Karadzic's compilation of epic poems as "the first systematic attempt to document the folk tradition."<sup>38</sup> A significant part of that collection consisted of epic poems that talk about the Kosovo Battle and events surrounding it. "With the demise of the Serbian medieval state, the historical traditions and epic poetry became the only integrating factor for the Serbian people, the most important elements of the communication system in the culture, and a means of spiritual survival and resistance to assimilation."<sup>39</sup> This epic poetry "ensured the continuation of collective memory."<sup>40</sup> History and identity were required fast and they were produced fast.<sup>41</sup>

In 1812, Russia signed the Treaty of Bucharest with the Ottoman Empire, and turned west to fight Napoleon. Without external support, Serbian rebels had to end the uprising temporarily. In 1815, the Serbs rebelled again. Determination led Serbia to the status of autonomy in 1817. That status improved in 1835 but final recognition of independence for Serbia and Montenegro would occur two years after the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1876, in 1878, with the Treaty of San Stefano.<sup>42</sup>

### Balkan Wars and Macedonian Question

The "Macedonian question" was one of the most important in international affairs Between the Berlin congress and Balkan Wars. In the middle of the diplomatic and military struggle for domination over this small province, a new nation was trying to emerge. Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia were claiming parts of Macedonia for themselves. Macedonians tried to fight everyone including the Ottomans. Macedonians formed their own revolutionary organization.<sup>43</sup> In 1912, in the First Balkan war, the alliance of

Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia drove out the Ottomans. In 1913, Bulgaria tried to make a revision of territories gained and declared war against Serbia and Greece. That proved to be the wrong move because Montenegro, Romania and the Ottomans joined Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria lost almost everything. The Serbs and the Greeks split the disputed Macedonian territories among themselves.<sup>44</sup> Balkan wars played a significant role in formation of the unfavorable Balkan image to European eyes.

### Yugoslav Idea

The Yugoslav idea started with language. Any national awakening requires some level of national engineering. Peoples of the Western Balkans always spoke very similar languages. It was not the case with writing. First attempts to reform language and way of writing were simultaneously the first “prototype” of the Yugoslav idea. First scholars to introduce the Yugoslav idea through language reform were Vuk Karadzic, Ljudevit Gaj and Djuro Danichic.<sup>45</sup> Beside collection of national oral traditions, Karadzic made his name as a Serbian language reformer. Ljudevit Gaj was an influential Croatian publicist who strongly supported the Yugoslav idea.<sup>46</sup>

These three intellectuals came up with consensus about the future language in the Western Balkans. Their conclusion was that South Slavs spoke three major dialects of a common tongue: *stokavian*, *cakavian* and *kajkavian*.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, Karadzic developed very advantageous orthography for the Serbian language.<sup>48</sup> Ljudevit Gaj applied identical principles in reform of the Croatian language. Ultimately, Gaj rejected Karadzic’s idea of unified orthography for all South Slavs. The Serbian language remained permanently tied to its Cyrillic based alphabet. Croatians favored the use of Latin alphabet.<sup>49</sup>

Anyway, their cooperation culminated in 1850 with Vienna Agreement. This agreement announced that Serb and Croat linguist intellectuals adopted the *stokavian* dialect as the foundation of a common Serbo-Croatian language with two separate but equal varieties. This language became the regular language of Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro.<sup>50</sup>

These events were the part of a wider movement called Illiryanism. Illiryanism was the prototype of Yugoslavism. In the beginning, it was apolitical and focused its goals to “the affirmation of the Illyrian language and culture.”<sup>51</sup> This movement originated in Croatia. It was limited to Croatian national revival because Serbia partially supported the idea but did not accept it in full.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, together with Serbian and Croatian pan-Slavism, the Illyrian movement was a strong base for later unification of Southern Slavs into single state in 1918.<sup>53</sup>

#### First Yugoslav Experiment

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was born in the aftermath of the First World War. People of the Western Balkans fought on different sides during the Great War but not by their choice.<sup>54</sup> The Montenegrins, Serbs and Croats from the former Habsburg Empire accepted the Serbian monarch’s leadership. Unfortunately, new state was too artificial and Serbian leadership was unprepared to govern such a big territory in a centralized manner. The strongest opposition came from the Croats.

Soon the kingdom changed its name into Kingdom of Yugoslavia but that would be the last attempt to develop common identity. Everything else was attempts of King Aleksandar I Karageorgevich to enforce his power in opposition to Croatian and Serbian elites with their “mutually exclusive national ideologies.”<sup>55</sup> King’s action was

predominantly in the political sphere, although he attempted to promote and grant autonomy to the Islamic and Catholic religious community. The Orthodox faith dominated the country that was only 47 percent Orthodox.<sup>56</sup> First Yugoslavia failed in the field of governance and cultural cooperation.<sup>57</sup> Analysts will blame Serbian dominance and unitarism.<sup>58</sup> Kingdom of Yugoslavia disappeared in the two-week German Balkan campaign in April 1941.

### Second World War

The Second World War was a very painful experience for the Western Balkans. It strongly shattered the Yugoslav dream. Roots of future fears and basis for strong ethnic bias were planted during this period. For the first time in the Western Balkans, South Slavs were willingly fighting each other. An extreme example of turmoil that was going on was the new regime of the new independent Croatia. Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska – Independent state of Croatia (NDH), was enlarged with Bosnia and some parts of former Serbian territories. Overnight, the structure of the population changed in favor of minorities. Croats made up only 50 percent of the population.<sup>59</sup> The NDH ideology tried to portray its genocidal policies as “organic part of Croatian culture and history,” but in fact it was serious “rupture with the past,” and Croatian culture.<sup>60</sup> Concentration camps, forced conversions and fascism were never a part of Croatian tradition before 1941. Genocide over Serbs happened also in Bosnia and in Kosovo.

Outcomes of the Second World War in the Western Balkans were spoiled ethnic relations, hatred, and fear that would remain in national memory until 1990s. Communist ideology of the Partisans won the contest with the Ustashe, Chetniks and other nationalist movements because of its multinational character but also because of international

support. New communist leadership would constitute new Yugoslavia in November 1943, and try to solve the national question of Yugoslavia.<sup>61</sup>

### Second Yugoslav Experiment

Second Yugoslavia lasted for almost 50 years. Tito's communist regime made significant attempts to build Yugoslav identity. Unfortunately, following the principles of communist international about national self-determination the majority of the population would stick to their particular national or ethnic identity, rather than to declare themselves as Yugoslavs. Despite all mixed marriages, only 6 percent of the population declared themselves as Yugoslav.<sup>62</sup> Even in Bosnia, the most heterogeneous of all republics, the situation was not much better.

Table 1. Proportion of the ethnic Muslims, Serbs, Croats, "Yugoslavs," and Other Nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1948-1991 (percentage)						
Year	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991
Muslims	30.7	31.3	25.7	39.6	39.5	43.8
Serbs	44.3	44.4	42.9	37.2	32.0	31.5
Croats	23.9	23.0	21.7	20.6	18.4	17.3
Yugoslavs	n/a	n/a	8.4	1.2	7.9	7.0
Others	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.2	1.4

*Sources:* Ante Markotic, "Demografski aspekt promjena u nacionalnoj strukturi stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine," *Sveske*, 16-17 (1986), 292; Tanjug (30 April 1991), trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 1 May, 1991, 53.

Communists believed that constraints on Croatian nationalism and prevention of Serbian hegemony would fix all deficiencies found in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. That is why Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a federal state. It comprised



six republics. New government recognized Montenegrins<sup>63</sup> and Macedonians as two new nations. After the census in 1961 and constitutional changes in 1963, Muslims became a nation as well.<sup>64</sup> Despite the shared language, Yugoslavia never instituted a common Yugoslav University or a strong and united cultural center.<sup>65</sup> Republics had their own institutions. With limited road and rail, network cultural exchange was also limited. Again, the Yugoslav idea was dependent on irrational foundations.

At the time of communist Yugoslavia, national myths of Serbs and Croats that glorified their respective history had to be modified. Beside the myths of Tito and “brotherhood and unity” that were new “brands” some kind of continuity with previous traditions had to be kept. Choice of communist leadership was another pearl of romanticism. It was Petar Petrovic Njegos<sup>66</sup> and his *Mountain Wrath*.<sup>67</sup>

Njegos was a Montenegrin Bishop, poet, and prince who advocated for the unification of South Slavs.<sup>68</sup> Although not openly about the battle of Kosovo Polje, *Mountain Wrath* encompasses numerous allusions to Kosovo and Serbian heroes.<sup>69</sup> Njegos’ poetry strongly captured the sentiments of Serbs longing for an exceptional heroic past and a return to honor through struggle against the Ottomans. Njegos’ parallels with the Last Supper led to common themes of nobility, heroes, assassination and loyalty. Njegos also addressed the problem of converts--Slav Muslims, and described the dilemma in the Montenegrin society about the relationship with them. His point about possible reconciliation and common future of Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic brothers was a turning point for communist leadership to accept his work as Yugoslav enough. It was widely used in schools to support the thesis about brotherhood and unity.<sup>70</sup> It was not enough for what was about to happen.

## Wars for Yugoslav Succession

Yugoslavia experienced serious economic crisis at the end of 1980s. The federal government was unable to resolve its financial problems. Yugoslavia's foreign debt was too high. Lacking international support, Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic, found himself lacking the support of local leaders. Local communist governments felt the tension among the workers who already started to riot at the end of 1980s.<sup>71</sup> Communist leadership refused to change and liberalize society towards democracy and market economy and gave up some of the authorities.<sup>72</sup>

Instead, they decided to stay in power at any price. Their communist rhetoric was replaced with nationalistic symbolism. That was the easiest way to mobilize large portions of populations without any effort to improve their governance. It was so easy to blame others for everything. And everybody did the same--they blamed others for current failures.

Old Myths found new leaders and new interpretations. The final acts of Yugoslav drama had actors that were skillful in using myth for political purposes. Two of the most prominent were presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman. Milosevic's speech on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of Kosovo Battle in 1989 was one of most quoted. His speech was short and sometimes inconsistent. More importantly, it contained allusions to fight, faith, medieval history, holy land, and Serbian heroes combined with a declaration of harmony and brotherhood in Yugoslavia.<sup>73</sup> Florian Bieber summed-up that Milosevic acknowledged in his speech that the epic mythology was more significant than the authentic history.

The symbiosis of myth and politically mobilized nationalism thus actually rendered historical facts irrelevant, as Milosevic himself intimated during his

speech at the commemoration: “it is difficult today to separate the legend from the history of this battle,” but he continued, “now this is no longer important”. . . The myth had transcended history because of its instrumentalism in a specific nationalist cause.<sup>74</sup>

Table 2. Timeline of Wars for Yugoslav Succession 1991-1999	
Year	Event
Summer 1991	Slovenia and Croatia declared independence; Federal Army withdraws from Slovenia after 12-day war; West recognizes both republics; Serbs and Croats begin fight in Croatia; Peacekeeping force sent to Croatia
Spring 1992	Bosnia declares independence; West recognizes Bosnia; War breaks out in Bosnia
Fall 1994	NATO intervenes from the air bombing Serbian runways
Summer 1995	Serbian forces captured Srebrenica; Croatian forces captured Krajina; NATO air attacks on Bosnian Serb objectives
Winter 1995	Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia signed Dayton Peace Accords; NATO peacekeeping force sent to Bosnia; War in Bosnia ended
March 1998	A counter guerilla war of Yugoslav armed forces with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) begins
September 1998	NATO issues ultimatum to Milosevic to ease crackdown on Kosovar Albanians or to face airstrikes
March 1999	Kosovo Albanians and Serbia fail to come to an agreement in Paris. NATO air strikes begin throughout Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
June 1999	NATO suspends bombing after withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo

Source: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson-Longman: 2005), 156-157.

The Serbian people once again had a leader that represented and demonstrated their national identity.<sup>75</sup> Milosevic also delivered a therapy to the years of perceived national tragedy at the hands of others. Julie Metros recapitulates the outcome of Milosevic’s rhetoric, “by capitalizing on the greatest myth in Serbian folklore, Milosevic

pockmarked Serbs not only against Albanians but also against the other enemy identified by the Kosovo myth: Slavic Muslims.”<sup>76</sup> Paradoxically, Slavic Muslim did not exist at the time of the Kosovo battle and there are some indications that Albanians fought on the Serbian side. Nevertheless, Milosevic was able to transfer the anger about the Ottoman conquer to current problems of the time.

Another leader, who arose at the same time in Croatia, was Franjo Tudjman. He managed to convince the Croats that Serbs are their ancient enemies. Years of his inflammable speeches and propaganda culminated with the thesis about Croatian origins in Turkey and influence over Hettite civilization. He was so brave to share the fact that about thirty Grand Viziers that ruled the Ottoman Empire originated from Croatia. He gave those accounts based upon a provisional look at checkerboard design found at some archeological site. Ivo Banac, historian at Yale commented about this event in *The New York Times*.

The checkerboard design signifies one thing to him and another to other investigators . . . Tudjman is a great believer in the clash of civilizations and Croatia’s role as a front line state against the Orthodox and Muslim East. I am not sure, how our new position as rulers of the Ottoman Empire and the Hittites will be explained to us now.<sup>77</sup>

Tudjman was also amazingly comfortable in his theorizing as all of the leaders from 1990s in the Western Balkans. All of them came from a communist background and all of them enjoyed the necessary support of the media. They used nationalistic symbolism and elites to manipulate the population and lead the violence, promoting “ethnicity as the only relevant identity.”<sup>78</sup> State-controlled media were providing strong support for these leaders. Under informed and undereducated populations were vulnerable to these speech acts.

During the period of Yugoslav dissolution, the problem of foreign intervention emerged. Although, necessary, the involvement of the international community in Yugoslav conflict suffered from double standards and lack of legitimacy. The international community introduced cultural identity issues indirectly. The mechanism was a precedent of supporting the right of national self-determination above the universally accepted right for territorial integrity.<sup>79</sup> Pointing out the right for national self-determination was signal to all separatist movements and reactionary forces to spur their nationalistic campaigns. The rationale was--higher level of national distinction results in better position for negotiations. This scenario first happened in Slovenia. International actors repeated that scenario in Croatia partially accepting Croatian right for self-determination and denying that right to the Serbian minority. Bosnian Muslims were less lucky. Despite the international recognition, Bosnia was peaceful after the Dayton Accords. This agreement in fact recognized the results of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Finally, the right for self-determination prevailed in the case of Kosovo against the Serbian territorial integrity. Real reasons for this discourse are still unclear. However, in this way, conflicts were transferred into an imaginary sphere of identities.

#### Societal Security Sector in the Western Balkans Security Sub-Complex Unit Level Analytical Approach

The next part of the analysis will focus on the societal security sector. To get a complete picture of the current situation in the societal security sector in the Western Balkans, this thesis utilizes on analyzing the strategic documents in each of the states in the region. Focus will be on how countries perceive threats to their culture and identity. The sub-chapter is organized in sections. Each section examines one of the regional units-

countries and how it perceives possible challenges, risks and threats in the societal security sector.

### Albania

The worst period of crisis and collapse of the security system after the riots of 1997 is far behind. Albanian National security and National Military Strategy were adopted in 2000 and 2002, respectively, and amended in 2005.<sup>80</sup> Strategic documents classify the threats into local, regional and global. On the regional level, Albania clearly defines “destabilization of the region through revival of the desire for fulfillment of exaggerated nationalistic project and development of trans-national ethnic conflicts” as danger for the security of the country. Additionally, on the local level they mention risk defined as “public opinion misinformation” and “insufficient development of education, science and culture.”<sup>81</sup> Ethnic clashes are ranked highly on position 5 as regional risk for the security, as possible cause of “unstable neighborhood.”<sup>82</sup> What makes the Albanian National Security Strategy (NSS) the most controversial in the region is the question of the “Albanian national issue” that NSS raises.<sup>83</sup>

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

Interestingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina in strategic document do not mention clearly cultural issues in any of the categories of challenges, risks or threats. As a major regional threat is identified interstate conflict.<sup>84</sup> However, Bosnian Military strategy positions “civil war, ethnic violence and secessionism” as possible challenges in the operational environment.<sup>85</sup> Although, these challenges resemble recent conflict in the region for some reason Military strategy describes them as global challenges.

## Croatia

Croatian strategic documents were developed in the period between 2002 and 2005.<sup>86</sup> The security risk breakdown acknowledged 21 security concerns.<sup>87</sup> Croatian analysis puts possible refugee crisis and ethnic clashes in high position among regional risks. Protection of ethnic minorities is another issue, but with less significance. Similarly, to Albania and Bosnia, Croatia also perceives the unstable neighborhood as the primary source of regional threats in the societal sector.<sup>88</sup>

## Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Strategic documents were developed in the period between 2001 and 2003.<sup>89</sup> The top three Macedonian concerns are “use of violence in resolving inter-ethnic disputes,” “pursuit of territorial solutions to ethnic issues,” and “damage to the multiethnic character of Macedonia’s society.” These threats are described as national. One regional threat is related to the societal security sector, and recent history. It is defined as the “legacy of a decade of hostilities in the region.”<sup>90</sup> It is obvious that focus is on actual dispute with the Albanian minority in the west of FYROM. The fear for territorial integrity of FYROM in case of another self-determination precedent is also evident.

## Montenegro

For some reason, Montenegrin strategic documents developed in the period between 2006 and 2008 failed to give substantial detail on challenges, risks and threats to Montenegrin security. The whole Montenegrin security framework is very general and broad, more related to global than regional issues. There are no societal challenges that Montenegro faces in this time, according to these documents. Even for those defined,

there is no explanation of potential sources.<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, Montenegrin educational and cultural institutions are very active in building the new Montenegrin cultural identity based upon language standardization nuances.

### Serbia and Kosovo

With exception of BIH's Defense Review (DR) and FYROM's revised Strategy of Defense (SOD), Serbia was the last to adopt its strategic documents in 2009.<sup>92</sup> Serbia was also the last republic to give up the Yugoslav identity. Three perceived threats are closely tied with the societal security sector. First is "separatism," defined as "separatist aspirations of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo."<sup>93</sup> Second is "unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo." Third is "national and religious extremism."<sup>94</sup> In case of Serbia, as in most of the neighboring countries, perceived threats are closely tied with recent conflicts and interconnected between security sectors. Kosovo provisional institutions have also adopted security documents. Kosovar authorities see the "integration of minority [Serbian] communities" as a challenge for the security of Kosovo citizens.<sup>95</sup>

### Cultural Identity and Future Cooperation in the Western Balkans Regional Analytical Approach

This subchapter focuses on cultural identity in relation to future security cooperation in the Western Balkans. Analysis begins with the parallels between state and regional security, and how regional identity could foster security cooperation. After that, it examines the most important problems standing in the way of forming regional identity. Finally, it offers some prospects of future cooperation.



## Why is Regional Identity Important for Security Cooperation?

Currently Western Balkans is in the phase of a security regime. That means the security in the region is maintained from outside, with agreements and foreign presence. In order to evolve to a security community, as most of Europe is now, Western Balkans need to take the security into its own hands. That is impossible without security cooperation. Building institutions and initiatives is not enough. The idea about common identity is also important. There is where regional identity comes into play. Within the societal security sector, cultural identity or its manifestations, in form of ethnic and religious identity or language are protected values. Cultural identity can also become an asset for maintaining the peace as a core value of security. How?

If cultural identity can be formed and maintained successfully, that means that social group maintains its cohesion and unity. The absence of a threat means more security. That is very desirable for any social group. If one looks at the region as a social group then it is logical that region is looking at security in the same way. That being said, the security of a region is not just the sum of individual securities. Without regional cultural identity, full security is not achievable. Today's problem with the Western Balkans is that the region is lacking its own regional identity, and that fact is neglected in current regional cooperation.<sup>96</sup> One can argue that the Western Balkans is quite distinctive, but the regional identity that is beneficial in the sense of security is “a required component for transferring the necessary loyalties to any social group.” Existence of an identity, that no one wants to identify and share loyalty with, is not valuable.

## What Problems Stand in the Way of New Regional Identity in the Western Balkans?

Obstacles standing before the new Western Balkans regional cultural identity are:

(1) European discourse about Western Balkans, (2) local discourse about Western Balkans, (3) bad reminiscences about Yugoslavia, and (4) current European institutions' approach to enlargement.<sup>97</sup> These obstacles are interconnected and rooted for some time. Fortunately, there is at least one solution for each.

European perception of the Western Balkans is not favorable at all. It is based upon the idea of the Balkans as "Europe's radically other," or totally opposite. Elsewhere in Europe, some regional identities are appreciated as "compatible or even complementary" with European identity. Being from the Western Balkans (unlike being from other western regions) indicates that one is not European.<sup>98</sup> In order to promote western Balkan regional identity Europe should also revise its own perception of the Western Balkans.

Self-perception of Western Balkan nations about themselves and their neighbors is almost as bad as the European perception of Balkans as a whole. For example, in Croatian discourse about Balkans, it is clear that Western Balkans belongs more to the "East" than to the "West." At this time, building a self-image of Croatia as a member of EU is irreconcilable with Western Balkans identity.<sup>99</sup> Perception among other Western nations is almost similar. Western Balkans is seen as something bad, backward or different from Europe. Belonging to the Western Balkans is perceived as an obstacle toward European integrations. Meaning of it is that nobody wants to identify with Western Balkans and without identification, there is no identity.

Bad recollection about Yugoslavia is another obstacle. Recent memories about war and dissolution are not pleasant for anyone in the region. New regional identity should not be a new Yugoslavia. It should represent just Western Balkans as it really is today, promoting common cultural values instead of differences.

Europe is seriously investing in all aspects of regional cooperation. However, results of that cooperation are poor. Why is that? It is because Europe is financing the cooperation but European policy of enlargement (e.g. EU) depends on individual (single country based) merits. That promotes competition—not cooperation. Contrary, Europe should foster collective integration or the policy—“first integrate regionally, and then integrate into Europe.”

### Chapter Summary

Analysis of significant historical events in the western Balkans shows that animosities and hatred are recently developed, contrary to the common belief that they are ancient. Cultural identities in the past saved for the purpose of unification. Political elites in the Western Balkans managed to socially construct cultural differences as threats to security. That process can be explained as securitization of “other.” According to Buzan’s model main securitization actors in the Western Balkans were political elites. Their speech acts consisted of exaggerating the folklore differences between nations, blaming others for internal problems and tendentious use of historical myth in order to mobilize the population for common cause. Functional actors were the media and press. Audiences were the respective populations of the Western Balkans. Open armed conflict was the most radical special measure adopted. Interference of international factors was inappropriate. Making the right for self-determination more important than territorial

integrity, transposed the conflict into an imaginary sphere, were local elites could manipulate the majority of the population.

Analysis of current strategic documents in the Western Balkans shows that Western Balkans nations still perceive each other as a threat. The process of de-securitization in the region still is not over. That prevents the Western Balkans to transforming itself from a security regime into a security community. At the end, Western Balkans is lacking the regional identity necessary for building up the security in the societal sector. Small adjustments in the European approach toward Western Balkans in the enlargement process could foster regional cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup>US Army Command and General Staff College, ST 20-10, *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, August 2012), 37.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Serena Nanda and Richard L. Warms, *Culture Counts: A Concise Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009), 69-286.

<sup>4</sup>This thesis uses the term “national engineering” in order to make the distinction from the commonly used terms of “nation building” and “state building.” One can understand the “national engineering” as the process of developing the national identity of a particular ethnic group. Apparently, the cultural aspect of this process is very important. Language is one of the most important manifestations of culture.

<sup>5</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 52.

<sup>6</sup>John L. Esposito, Darrell J. Fasching, and Todd Lewis, *World Religions Today* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 150.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 170.

<sup>8</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 36.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>10</sup>Both, King Kresimir IV and his elected successor King Zvonimir died without a male heirs of the throne. Zvonimir's widow, being related to the Hungarian kings of the time called for the Hungarian intervention.

<sup>11</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 24.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>David Bruce Macdonald, *Balkan Holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian Victim Centered Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 255.

<sup>14</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 36.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 44.

<sup>19</sup>Often, modern Bosnian authors are claiming that the most of the Bogomil population converted to Islam. Some local customs unique in the Islam world go in favor of that claims.

<sup>20</sup>John R. Athey, "Groundhog Day: Expectation Management by Examining Warfare in the Early Twentieth Century Balkans" (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2007), 28-29.

<sup>21</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 42-43.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 46-47.

<sup>23</sup>Athey, "Groundhog Day, 28-29. The conquest was complete in 1479 when Venice came to peace terms with the Sultan, agreeing to pay tribute for their freedom. Mehmed II, now known as Mehmed the Conqueror, went on to attack Italy and Venice as well. His heirs would go on to conquer more lands in both Asia and Africa, but for the purposes of this profile, the conquest of the Balkans was complete by the beginning of the 16th century.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>25</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 48.

<sup>26</sup>Anthony J. Rudd, "Ottoman Pacification of the Balkans 1450-1650 C.E." (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2009), 35. The millet system was instrumental in providing almost complete autonomous rule to many of the outlying areas where the populace may or may not see a representative of the central government.

<sup>27</sup>Peter F. Sugar, *A History of East Central Europe: Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804*, vol. 7 (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1977).

<sup>28</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 48-49.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 50-51.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.* When Ottoman expelled the Hapsburg invaders and established control amid a welter of atrocities, about 40000 Serbs headed with their Patriarch arsenije Charnojevic, fled over Danube. They settled in the newly established Hapsburg Slavonia-Vojvodina military border region.

<sup>33</sup>In 1713, an independent Serbian archbishopric was established in Sremski Karlovci (today's Vojvodina).

<sup>34</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 56-57.

<sup>35</sup>The Banat Uprising of 1594 (Today's Vojvodina) had far reaching effects for the Serbs, becoming, until the First Serbian Uprising in 1804, the greatest example of Serbian nationalism. It showed Ottoman vulnerability to uprisings spurned from the outside.

<sup>36</sup>These romantic visions were more appropriate for the poor and mostly illiterate agrarian populations. To make these stories more widespread, political actors had to use common language. The medium for transfer of ideas was the literature developed from stunning oral tradition.

<sup>37</sup>Karadzic devoted his life to collecting and recording the Serbian oral traditions and epic poetry. His work originated with references to the Kosovo epic. Karadzic published his first compilation of epic poems under title "Kosovo Cycle."

<sup>38</sup>Alexander Greenawalt, "Kosovo Myths: Karadzic, Njegos, and the Transformation of Serb Memory," *Spaces of Identity* 3, no. 1 (March 2001): 49-65.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 64.

<sup>41</sup>One can conclude about the period of romantic nationalism in 19th century that ends were independent nation-states. Ways relied somewhat on literature and oral traditions. Myths were means in the strategy of national engineering in the Western Balkans of that time.

<sup>42</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 58-63. The Treaty of San Stefano was revised just four months later with congress of Berlin. Independence was not questioned but Bosnia and Sandzak were put under Austro-Hungarian occupation preventing Serbia and Montenegro from uniting.

<sup>43</sup>Internal Revolutionary Macedonian Organization (IMRO).

<sup>44</sup>Hupchick and Cox, *The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Balkans*, 56.

<sup>45</sup>Djuro Danichic was also a Serb, linguist and translator, famous for his translation of holly Bible into Serbian language, following Karadzic's reformed alphabet.

<sup>46</sup>Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias*, 40.

<sup>47</sup>These terms were derived from the variant interrogative pronoun "sto?," "ca?" and "kaj?" meaning "what?."

<sup>48</sup>The result of his work was language consistent in pronunciation, without any silent letters. His reform made the language easy to learn. Reading and writing became simpler. His pragmatic motto "write as you speak and read as you write" was very popular and practical.

<sup>49</sup>Apart from the aesthetically and politically very sensitive question of the two different alphabets, the differences between the Serbian and Croatian varieties are linguistically quite minor. The main one is the way in which they signal the varying quantity (long or short) of the letter e. Thus, for example, the "ekavian" (eastern/Serbian) and "ijekavian" (western/Croatian) variants of the word "river" are "reka" and "rijeka." The "ekavian" form is normally written in Cyrillic script, but can be transliterated exactly using the modified Latin alphabet adopted in Croatian orthography. Serbo-Croatian was completely regular in pronunciation.

<sup>50</sup>This speech community is bounded to the north-west by Slovenia, where the kajkavian dialect forms the basis of the modern standard language, and to the south-east by Macedonia, where the national language of the Slav inhabitants is close kin to standard Bulgarian. The cakavian dialect now survives only as an attenuated vernacular in the remoter island regions of Dalmatia.

<sup>51</sup>Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 24.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnian Slavic Muslims were mobilized in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian Army as other Slavic nations throughout Europe. Serbs and Montenegrins fought on the side of the Entente.

<sup>55</sup>Ivo Banac, *The National Question of Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell university Press, 1984), 407.

<sup>56</sup>Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias*, 94-95.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 603.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 115.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid. The population of NDH was approximately 6 million, and consisted of 3 million of Croats, almost 2 million of Serbs, 500000 Bosnian Muslims and 500000 others.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 117.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 157.

<sup>62</sup>Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 186.

<sup>63</sup>Until 1945, “Montenegrin” was just a territorial distinction for Serbian people living in Montenegro.

<sup>64</sup>Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brooking Institution, 1995), 95.

<sup>65</sup>Djilas, *The Contested Country*, 184.

<sup>66</sup>Rulers of Montenegro in 18th and 19th century were simultaneously political and spiritual leaders because they hold the position of “vladika,” religious title equivalent of bishop.

<sup>67</sup>Njegos began to write poetry at a very early age, when he was only six-teen. His four books of poetry *The Voice of Mountaineers* (1833), *The Cure for Turkish Fury* (1834), *The Song of Freedom* (1835, published 1854), and *The Serbian Mirror* (1845) - attest to the fact that poetry was foremost on his mind and in his heart, even when he was preoccupied with other concerns. His early poems imitate the folk poetry with which he grew up and whose influence stayed with him his entire life. As he matured, imitation gave way to his own renditions of the overriding theme of Serbian folk epic poetry - the struggle against the Turkish occupation or the threat thereof, and the eventual liberation from it. The freeing of all Serbs from the Turkish yoke was Njegos lifelong dream, both



as a statesman and as a poet. In poems like "A New Montenegrin Poem about the War between the Russians and the Turks"(1828) and "A Montenegrin Captured by a Fairy" (1834), Njegos glorifies the bravery of the Serbs in that struggle as epitomized by Karageorge, the leader of the First Serbian Uprising against the Turks in 1804. Yet, even though these poems are imbued with the heroic spirit of folk poetry and follow its formalistic features, they also reveal the authenticity and potential power of Njegos's own poetic talent, which would be manifested in his later works.

<sup>68</sup>Vasa D. Mihailovic, "Introduction for The Mountain Wreath by Petar Njegos II" Project Rastko, Internet Library of Serbian Culture, [www.rastko.org.yu/knjizevnost.umetnicka.njegos.mountain\\_wreath.html#introduction](http://www.rastko.org.yu/knjizevnost.umetnicka.njegos.mountain_wreath.html#introduction) (accessed 20 March 2013). He wrote this lengthy poem in the traditional decasyllabic fashion. This form of poetry rarely rhymes and contains exactly ten syllables on each line with breaks after the fourth syllable. It was common for Serbian and Montenegrin oral folk tradition from 15th to 19th century.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid. Vasa D. Mihailovic, who translated *The Mountain Wreath* into English, described the foundation of the work as: "his [Njegos'] own renditions of the overriding theme of Serbian folk epic poetry--the struggle against the Turkish occupation or the threat thereof, and the eventual liberation from it. . . . It epitomizes the spirit of the Serbian people kept alive for centuries; indeed, there is no other literary work with which the Serbs identify more. . . . [I]t gave Njegos an opportunity to formulate his own philosophical views, views which also reflect and further inspire those of his nation."

<sup>70</sup>However, brutal lines about killings and those depicting hatred were often tendentiously omitted.

<sup>71</sup>Dave Stratman, "Why is the U.S. Bombing Yugoslavia?: The Hidden History of the War," <http://www.newdemocracyworld.org/old/yugo.htm> (accessed May 10, 2013).

<sup>72</sup>Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 15.

<sup>73</sup>Peter B. Lugar, "The History and Effects of Kosovo Polje Mythology" (Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2009), 76.

<sup>74</sup>Florian Bieber, "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering," *Rethinking History* 6, no. 1 (2002): 101-102.

<sup>75</sup>Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 344.

<sup>76</sup>Julie A. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 181.

<sup>77</sup>Chris Hedges, "Croatia's President Polishes a National Myth," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/28/world/croatia-s-president-polishes-a-national-myth.html> (accessed March 30, 2013).

<sup>78</sup>Staurt J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 5.

<sup>79</sup>Ana S. Trbovich, *A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1.

<sup>80</sup>Enri Hide and Geron Kamberi, "Albania," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 9.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, 32

<sup>83</sup>Adel Abusara, "Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Documents of the Western Balkans," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 179.

<sup>84</sup>Kenan Dautovic, "Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 58.

<sup>85</sup>*Ibid.*, 58-59.

<sup>86</sup>Zvonimir Mahechic, "Croatia," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 62.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, 78-79.

<sup>89</sup>Islam Yusufi, "Macedonia," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 97.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, 122-123.

<sup>91</sup>Rajko Radevic, "Montenegro," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 125-139.

<sup>92</sup>Abusara, "Comparative Analysis of the Strategic Documents of the Western Balkans," 169.

<sup>93</sup>Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008. Serbia official politics does not accept this status, and looks on political status of Kosovo through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution number 1244.

<sup>94</sup>Maja Bjelos, "Serbia," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 162.

<sup>95</sup>Florian Qehaja, "Kosovo," in *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic, Milorad Timotic, and Predrag Petrovic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2010), 94.

<sup>96</sup>Koneska, "Regional Identity," 82.

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>99</sup>Natasa Zambeli, "Between the Balkans and the West: A problem of Croatian Identity in the Post Tudjman Period and Discursive Reconstruction of the Region," *Politicka Misao* 1 (2010): 55-76.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this last chapter is to restate the findings that arose from the aforementioned “interpretation of the research evidence.”<sup>1</sup> Chapter 5 confirms answers to research questions, and explains the significance of conclusions for future research of culture and security. Recommendations strive in two directions. The first group of recommendations applies to security actors and their actions. The second group of recommendations gives direction for possible future research of the topic.

#### Conclusions

##### Research Questions Answered

This research originated with the hypothesis that cultural identity is critically important for the security in the Western Balkans. Although, no one can deny the importance of culture in a complex ethnic and religious environment of the Western Balkans, this thesis rejects the criticality of that relationship. Regional security of the Western Balkans is not critically dependent on cultural identity.

If the previous were to be true, then the history of the region should confirm often-mentioned mental model of “civilizational clashes,”<sup>2</sup> and “ancient hatreds” between ethnic groups or nations in the region.<sup>3</sup> That was not the case.<sup>4</sup> In fact, history can confirm that most of the crucial historical events affected the formation of the complicated cultural identity model in the Western Balkans, not vice versa. Bloody and violent conflicts with outrageous disrespects of international laws and conventions are the product of recent history, from WWII to recent conflicts in 1990s.<sup>5</sup> On few occasions, in

fact the cultural similarities, helped Western Balkans nations to communicate, establish cooperation or even get close to the common cultural identity of their own. Two attempts to form common Yugoslav identity failed for many reasons. Despite the fact that both Yugoslavias were more a product of foreign political will, than the will of its people, economic crisis<sup>6</sup> and crisis of governance<sup>7</sup> played the most significant role in the Yugoslav failure.

Western Balkans nations lost their interest in living together in the beginning of the 1990s. However, the communist leaderships of constitutive republics did not lose their interest in remaining in power. The communist leadership of the time was not prepared or not willing to give up its position and facilitate the upcoming social change that spread across the Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>8</sup> They had changed their communist rhetoric with essentially a false multiparty system and “symbolic nationalism”<sup>9</sup> or “populism.”<sup>10</sup> Communist politicians were lacking the popular support because of their poor performance. At some point, they blackmailed their populations with forcible conflict participation, based upon ethnic identity, which people could not change. The ethnic conflict took people’s attention from real existential questions to socially constructed existential questions. All anger that the working class exhibited as an economic grievance for a better life was transformed and channeled through the “strategy of blaming the other”<sup>11</sup> by communist leadership. Elites acted “instrumentally in pursuit of power,” though the followers acted “emotionally, out of fear.”<sup>12</sup> That is how the cultural identity was securitized in societies of the Western Balkans. Attempts of international community in the Western Balkans to mitigate the conflicts were also

wrong. Supporting the right for self-determination of secessionist republics in former, Yugoslavia emphasized ethnicity as more important than territorial integrity.<sup>13</sup>

The theory of securitization explains this process of social construction of security threats. In addition, it teaches that the securitization process is reversible. As it is possible for securitization actors with great social capacity to produce a security problem in a certain society, it is also possible to “desecuritize” the same issue. The analysis of the security threats, challenges and risks from strategic documents in the Western Balkans region shows that in most of the countries neighbors are still perceived as a threat. Among other problems this one of the most important obstacles that prevent the Western Balkans to transform from security regime constellation to the security community. Any form of future security cooperation depends over desecuritization of cultural identity of others in the region. The question of cultural identity in the region is not addressed adequately in the process of current security reforms. Cultural identity of others, securitized in the 1990s, is still a problem.

Finally, the Western Balkans security in the future depends on something currently almost unimaginable--a common Western Balkans identity. The common Western Balkans identity seems to be far off but it is certainly achievable having in mind cultural similarities instead of cultural differences. This new identity should bring a new meaning to the Western Balkan region. That new identity should show the will of Western Balkans nations to accept each other and build a better future. The logic behind this idea is simple. Currently Western Balkans nations are trying to make fruitful connections with EU and NATO, neglecting its closest neighbors. This thesis argues that the security dilemma is always present and more security for one country is less security

for its neighbor. The Western Balkan region could overcome this dilemma by building the common identity and finally desecuritizing each other. In that case, the security of one is security for all.

Although, Cultural identity was not critically important for security in the Western Balkans in the past, the region and international community can contribute and benefit from proper utilization of cultural identity in the future. Successful building of the new, common identity of the Western Balkans will contribute to the security at least in one security sector- societal security sector. Western Balkans nations can contribute with more mutual understanding and change in rhetoric, and the International community can contribute by facilitating the new positive identity or image of the Western Balkans. Both will benefit from the Western Balkans as a security community instead of a security regime maintained from the outside.

#### Significance of Conclusions for Future Research

Future research can benefit from the conclusions revealed in this thesis. The significance of the conclusions provides a shorter path for future research. This thesis is deficient in empirical quantitative evidence, but provides the researcher with solid basic knowledge on the topic and gives the direction for further possible research that will fill that.

#### Recommendations

##### Recommendations for Action

On a state level, elite political actors should behave with more responsibility than in the recent past, and avoid the challenge of mobilizing the populace with “virtual

blackmail.” Everyone should contribute towards the process of deconstructing the “others” as security threats, leaving behind false myths and questionable history.

On a regional level, all parties involved should foster regional cooperation and cultural exchange of any form. Responsible approach towards educational and cultural exchange in the region will help in forming a new Western Balkans cultural identity. One that will be equally acceptable for those inside the Western Balkans, and those from outside the region.

On the international level, one of Mersheimer’s formulas is surely appropriate: “States that teach a dishonest self-exculpating or self-glorifying history should be publicly criticized and sanctioned.”<sup>14</sup> Additionally, handling of the “absolute demands” for self-determination, in the future should deserve more serious and “extremely careful” considerations, than in case of former Yugoslavia.<sup>15</sup>

#### Recommendations for Future Research

Possible future research of the topic should provide more quantitative data to support findings found in this thesis. Works of Mitrovic<sup>16</sup> and especially Kalyvas<sup>17</sup> are good models for empirical quantitative research of a social phenomenon in the scope of this topic. This thesis intentionally avoided use of maps for ethical reasons but developing a serious cultural map or model of the Western Balkans would be worthy of effort.

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<sup>1</sup>US Army Command and General Staff College, ST 20-10, *Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, August 2012), 37.

<sup>2</sup>Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” 22.



- <sup>3</sup>Kaplan, "Reading Too Much Into a Book," 4-17.
- <sup>4</sup>Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias*.
- <sup>5</sup>Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds*.
- <sup>6</sup>Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*.
- <sup>7</sup>Ramet, *Three Yugoslavias*.
- <sup>8</sup>Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*.
- <sup>9</sup>Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds*.
- <sup>10</sup>Tonci Cuzmanic, "Disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia and Its Legacy: Populism Not Nationalism," in *The Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Causes Dynamics and Effects*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004), 81-102.
- <sup>11</sup>Vlasta Jalusich, "Gender and Victimization of the Nation as Pre- and Post-War Identity Discourse," in *The Violent Dissolution of Yugoslavia: Causes Dynamics and Effects*, ed. Miroslav Hadzic (Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004), 157.
- <sup>12</sup>Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 61.
- <sup>13</sup>Trbovich, *A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration*, 1.
- <sup>14</sup>Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," 33.
- <sup>15</sup>Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 163.
- <sup>16</sup>Mitrovic, *Regionalni identitet i odnos aktera prema procesima globalizacije, regionalizacije i evrointegracije Balkana*.
- <sup>17</sup>Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

## GLOSSARY

**Case.** This is the unit of analysis in a case study. It involves the study of a specific case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting. The case may be an event, a process, a program, or several people.

**Conflict formation.** A pattern of security interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations

**Desecuritization.** A process by which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat. The process can be directly discursive addressing the definition of the situation; more often it is indirect, where a shift of orientation towards other issues reduces the relative attention to the previously securitized issue.

**Instrumental case study.** This is a type of case study with the focus on a specific issue rather than on case itself. The case then becomes a vehicle to better understand the issue.

**Millet.** Basic unit in Ottoman System of Non-Muslim administration. The word *Millet* comes from the Arabic language. The word *millah* means "nation." All non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire were distributed among three *millets* according to three major faiths other than Islam: Orthodox Christians, Jews and Armenian Christians.

**Overlay.** When the interests of external great powers transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local dynamics of security interdependence virtually cease to operate. It usually results in the long-term stationing of great power armed forces in the region, and in the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of great power rivalry.

**Securitization.** The discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.

**Security community.** A pattern of security interdependence in which the units do not expect or prepare for the use of force in their political relations with each other.

**Security constellation.** The whole pattern formed by the interplay of the four levels, (1) domestic, (2) regional, (3) interregional, and (4) global.

**Security regime.** A pattern of security interdependence still shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations, but where those fears and

expectations are restrained by agreed sets of rules of conduct, and expectations that those rules will be observed.

**Social constructivism.** In this interpretive framework, qualitative researchers seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. They develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrow the meanings into a few categories or ideas. The goal of research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the participants' views of the situation. Often these subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically.

**Sub-complex.** Essentially the same as an RSC, the difference being that a subcomplex is firmly embedded within a larger RSC.

**Regional security complex.** A set of units whose major processes of complex securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another

**Weak states.** Those states having low levels of sociopolitical cohesion and generally high levels of internal political violence.

**Yugoslavism.** Belief in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural unity of South Slavs. Support for their unification, and belief that South Slavs are or should become one nation.

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